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ARTICLES
A CONTRACTARIAN ARGUMENT
AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY
CLAIRE FINKELSTEIN*
Opponents of the death penalty typically base their opposition on contingent fea-
tures of its administration, arguing that the death penalty is applied discriminato-
rily, that the innocent are sometimes executed, or that there is insufficient evidence
of the death penalty’s deterrent efficacy.  Implicit in these arguments is the sugges-
tion that if these contingencies did not obtain, serious moral objections to the death
penalty would be misplaced.  In this Article, Professor Finkelstein argues that there
are grounds for opposing the death penalty even in the absence of such contingent
factors.  She proceeds by arguing that neither of the two prevailing theories of pun-
ishment—deterrence and retributivism—is capable of justifying the death penalty.
More generally, she suggests that while each theory captures an important part of
the justification for punishment, each must appeal to some further limiting principle
to accommodate common intuitions about appropriate punishments for crimes.
Professor Finkelstein claims that contractarianism supplies this additional prin-
ciple, by requiring that individuals consent to the system of punishment under
whose threat they must live. Moreover, on the version of contractarianism for which
she argues, they must do so based on a belief that they will benefit under the terms
of that system as compared with how they would fare in its absence.  While the
notion of benefit is often best understood in terms of maximizing one’s expected
utility, Professor Finkelstein argues that with respect to choices about the basic
structure of society, rational contractors will conceive of benefit in terms of a con-
servative, “no-gambling” decision rule.  She then argues that rational contractors
applying this conception of benefit would reject any system of punishment that
includes the death penalty.  For while contractors would recognize the death pen-
alty’s deterrent value, they must also consider the high cost they would pay in the
event they end up subject to such a penalty.  This Article presents both a significant
new approach to the death penalty and a general theory of punishment, one that
incorporates the central intuitions about deterrence and desert that have made com-
peting theories of punishment seem compelling.
* Copyright  2006 by Claire Finkelstein, Professor of Law and Philosophy, University
of Pennsylvania.  Ph.D, University of Pittsburgh; J.D., Yale Law School; B.A., Harvard
University.  I am grateful to Larry Alexander, Russell Christopher, Michael Davis, David
Gauthier, Leo Katz, Sharon Lloyd, Michael Ridge, Geoff Sayre-McCord, Thomas Pogge,
Connie Rosati, and Seana Shiffrin for their comments on drafts at various stages of com-
pletion, as well as to audiences at the University of Pennsylvania faculty retreat, the
Rutgers Law School Faculty Workshop, the American Philosophical Association Eastern
Division meeting, the University of Pennsylvania conference on Contract, Consent, and
the Law, and participants in the Florida State Legal Theory Workshop.  I am also grateful
to Matthew Mills for assistance with research.  I also wish to thank the editors of the New
York University Law Review for their truly exceptional editorial assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
Opponents of the death penalty fall into two groups.  The first
group does not oppose the death penalty per se.  It opposes the death
penalty either because it sees its use as connected with other objec-
tionable practices or because of particular features of the circum-
stances in which the death penalty is used.  Members of this first
group argue, for example, that the death penalty cannot be nondis-
criminatorily administered in a country rife with background racial
discrimination,1 that it cannot be fairly and effectively administered
when used as sparingly as it is usually used,2 that having a death pen-
alty creates too great a gulf between the United States and other dem-
ocratic nations,3 or that there is insufficient evidence that the death
penalty has greater deterrent value than life in prison without parole.4
We can characterize this first group’s opposition to the death penalty
as contingent in nature.
The second group’s opposition to the death penalty runs deeper.
Members of this group believe that the death penalty is morally
impermissible, regardless of how evenhanded its administration or
beneficial its consequences.  For such opponents, no set of empirical
1 See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145–46 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (arguing death penalty is unconstitutional due to irreparable racial
disparities in application); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 364–66 (1972) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in judgment) (“It is immediately apparent that Negroes [are] executed far more
often than whites in proportion to their percentage of the population.”); Randall L.
Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1425 (1988) (“[T]he legal authorities in Georgia [discriminate against
African-Americans] when they repeatedly sentence killers of blacks less harshly than
killers of whites for approximately similar crimes.”).
2 See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 442 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“[T]he
effort to eliminate arbitrariness in the infliction of that ultimate sanction is so plainly
doomed to failure that it—and the death penalty—must be abandoned altogether.”);
Furman, 408 U.S. at 291–95 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (comparing current
death penalty system to lottery and arguing that it is inflicted arbitrarily); id. at 309–10
(Stewart, J., concurring in judgment) (arguing death penalty is unconstitutional because it
is capriciously imposed); Jack Greenberg, Against the American System of Capital Punish-
ment, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1670, 1675 (1986) (“We have a system of capital punishment that
results in infrequent, random, and erratic executions . . . .”).
3 See Stephen B. Bright, Will the Death Penalty Remain Alive in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury?:  International Norms, Discrimination, Arbitrariness, and the Risk of Executing the
Innocent, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 1, 2–4 (discussing international trend toward abolition of
death penalty).
4 See Michael L. Radelet & Ronald L. Akers, Deterrence and the Death Penalty:  The
Views of the Experts, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 10 (1996) (“[T]he death penalty
does, and can do, little to reduce rates of criminal violence.”).  Some studies purport to find
that the death penalty has a “brutalizing” effect, increasing the amount of violent crime.
See, e.g., William J. Bowers & Glenn L. Pierce, Deterrence or Brutalization:  What Is the
Effect of Executions?, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 453, 481–84 (1980) (finding increase in homi-
cides in New York State in months following executions).
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circumstances can cure the moral impermissibility of the death pen-
alty.  We can characterize this group’s opposition to the death penalty
as categorical, rather than contingent.5
Public opposition to the death penalty in the United States tends
to take the first, rather than the second, form.  This is not surprising,
since American courts have been more receptive to contingent chal-
lenges to the legality of the death penalty than to categorical ones.
The Supreme Court, for example, has consistently rejected the claim
that the death penalty is per se cruel and unusual punishment and
therefore banned by the Eighth Amendment.6  The only successful
attacks have been sharply circumscribed and carefully tied to specific
forms of its administration or particular circumstances in which it
might be used.  Thus, the Court has found the death penalty unconsti-
tutional if assigned as a mandatory penalty for particular crimes,7 if a
jury can impose it in an entirely discretionary way,8 if used against
juveniles,9 if imposed on a relatively uninvolved coconspirator,10 or if
used for any crime other than murder.11  Even at the height of judicial
skepticism, then, the death penalty was presumed to be constitutional
as long as certain restrictions on its administration were in place.12
5 The American constitutional tradition comes closest to articulating a non-contingent
abolitionist stance in the opinions of former Supreme Court Justices Marshall and
Brennan. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 1–2; see also Furman, 408 U.S. at 290 (Brennan,
J., concurring) (“The calculated killing of a human being by the state involves, by its very
nature, a denial of the executed person’s humanity.”).  In Gregg v. Georgia, Justice
Brennan stated:
[F]oremost among the “moral concepts” recognized in our cases and inherent
in the [Cruel and Unusual Punishments] Clause is the primary moral principle
that the State, even as it punishes, must treat its citizens in a manner consistent
with their intrinsic worth as human beings—a punishment must not be so
severe as to be degrading to human dignity.
428 U.S. 153, 229 (1976).
6 E.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169.
7 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (holding mandatory death pen-
alty without admission of individualized evidence at sentencing unconstitutional).
8 Furman, 408 U.S. at 239–40, 256–57 (Douglas, J., concurring in judgment) (arguing
statutes authorizing death penalty based on unguided discretion are unconstitutional).
9 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574–75 (2005) (affirming decision finding death
penalty unconstitutional under Eighth Amendment for offenders under eighteen years
old).
10 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982) (finding death penalty unconstitutional
if inflicted on relatively uninvolved accomplice).
11 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (holding death penalty for rape
unconstitutional).
12 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring in judgment) (withholding judg-
ment whether equally applied death penalty violates Eighth Amendment); id. at 306
(Stewart, J., concurring in judgment) (“[T]wo of my Brothers have concluded that the
infliction of the death penalty is constitutionally impermissible in all circumstances under
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.  Their case is a strong one.  But I find it unneces-
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The purpose of this Article is to provide a philosophical founda-
tion for the second, categorical form of opposition to the death pen-
alty.  Two disclaimers are in order.  First, while the argument I offer is
intended to provide a foundation for categorical opposition to the
death penalty, it is not itself categorical.  As will be clear, the argu-
ment I present is significantly less dependent on empirical factors than
the contingent arguments mentioned above, but it does rely on one
empirical assumption—that the death penalty has at most a moder-
ately strong deterrent effect.  In my view, the argument comes as close
to being categorical as possible, by showing that the death penalty is
unjustifiable under any circumstances that one might reasonably
expect to encounter.  While I offer this argument primarily for its nor-
mative implications, I also intend it as a means of reconstructing or
explaining the intuitions of those who think the death penalty is
impermissible under all circumstances.  That intuition, I suggest, is
practically, but not perfectly, categorical.  Thus the residual empirical
dependence of my argument will not undercut it.
The second disclaimer is that I do not mean this argument to
diminish the importance of the contingent reasons the first group
offers as providing a basis for rejecting the death penalty.  In general,
those arguments are good ones.  But they are weak in that they leave
death penalty opponents open to the suggestion that our primary legal
efforts should be directed toward the elimination of such factors.  I
doubt, however, that many death penalty opponents would abandon
their opposition if the various contingent factors they cite as the
grounds for opposition were removed.
To insulate my argument from the vast bulk of contingent factors,
I make four assumptions.  First, I assume the death penalty can be
administered without distortion from racial or other kinds of invidious
bias.  While this assumption has been called into question with respect
to the current American legal system,13 it is not difficult to imagine a
state of affairs in which this is so.  Second, I assume the death penalty
has a non-negligible deterrent effect.  Once again, the evidence on
sary to reach the ultimate question they would decide.”); id. at 310–11 (White, J., concur-
ring in judgment) (declining to hold death penalty per se unconstitutional).
13 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1987) (citing David C. Baldus et al.,
Comparative Review of Death Sentences:  An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience,
74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983) (demonstrating bias correlated to race of victim
in administration of death penalty)); David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Dis-
crimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty:  An Overview of the Empirical Evi-
dence with Special Emphasis on the Post-1990 Research, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 194, 202 (2003)
(reviewing multiple post-1990 studies and finding widespread race-of-victim discrimination
and some indication of race-of-defendant discrimination).
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whether the death penalty deters is arguably still indeterminate,14 but
it is not implausible to suppose that the threat of death could deter
under certain conditions.  Third, I assume that the criminal justice
system can be made highly reliable, such that no innocent person
would ever be executed.15  This assumption is perhaps the most
improbable of the three, as the possibility of mistaken convictions
appears to be an unavoidable feature of any criminal justice system.
Nonetheless, I include it in the list of contingent factors from which I
wish to abstract because I do not want the strength of the argument
against the death penalty to depend on the number of innocent lives
at risk.
My fourth assumption is of a different sort, as it is philosophical,
rather than empirical.  Moreover, while the first three assumptions
raise the bar for a successful argument against the death penalty, the
fourth assumption makes it easier to argue against the death penalty.
The assumption is that punishment is painful or otherwise highly
unpleasant, and, for this reason, its imposition is undesirable to
anyone subject to it.16  We can therefore infer that punishment stands
in need of an affirmative justification before it can be permissibly
applied.  The burden is therefore on the death penalty proponent to
justify its use.  If I am right to help myself to this final assumption, an
argument against the death penalty can be won simply by combating
arguments in its favor.  This is how I will proceed initially, although I
14 Sunstein and Vermeule point to recent studies suggesting a strong deterrent effect
from executions, such as that each execution may deter eighteen murders.  Cass R.
Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required?  Acts, Omissions,
and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703, 711 (2005).  Donohue and Wolfers, how-
ever, argue convincingly that these studies are unreliable, in particular because the number
of executions on which these conclusions are based is small relative to the number of
murders each year; even if a deterrent effect were present, it would be impossible to detect.
See John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the
Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791, 794 (2005) (“[T]he death penalty . . . is
applied so rarely that the number of homicides it can plausibly have caused or deterred
cannot be reliably disentangled from the large year-to-year changes in the homicide rate
caused by other factors.”).
15 See infra note 89 for a brief discussion of the implications for my position of relaxing
this assumption and allowing for the possibility that at least one innocent person would be
executed under a death penalty system.
16 This is not to say that there have never been criminals who desired their punishment,
either because they did not find it painful or because they thought they deserved to suffer.
But such cases must be exceedingly rare. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSI-
BILITY:  ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 4 (1968) (“[Punishment] must involve pain or
other consequences normally considered unpleasant.”); Louis P. Pojman, For the Death
Penalty, in LOUIS P. POJMAN & JEFFREY REIMAN, THE DEATH PENALTY:  FOR AND
AGAINST 1, 5 (1998) (defining punishment as “an evil inflicted by a person in a position of
authority upon another person who is judged to have violated a rule”) (emphasis omitted).
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will provide more affirmative reasons for rejecting the death penalty
later in this Article.
In what follows, I consider the two principal justifications propo-
nents offer for the death penalty:  deterrence and retribution.  I
address the argument from deterrence in Part I, where I consider
whether the fact that the death penalty saves innocent lives, if true,
would be sufficient to establish its moral acceptability.  I argue that it
would not be.  I then consider whether the lives saved by the death
penalty’s deterrent power would be sufficient to make the death pen-
alty morally acceptable if the aim of deterrence were supplemented
with a retributivist limiting condition.  I conclude that deterrence fails,
both as a stand-alone justification and as a primary element in a mixed
theory.  In Part II, I consider whether the death penalty can be justi-
fied on retributive grounds alone.  I conclude in this Part that even if
retribution turned out to be a compelling justification for other pun-
ishments, it is not a sufficient rationale for the death penalty.
The deterrent benefits and the moral appropriateness of punish-
ment both seem important in justifying punishment, yet both justifica-
tions lead to objectionable consequences if taken alone.  From our
discussion in Parts I and II, then, I conclude that some other principle
must be at work—one that imposes appropriate constraints on deter-
rence and desert.  In Part III, I suggest that this principle is a con-
tractarian one and argue that the most compelling justification for a
system of punishment is the fact that individuals settling on a basic
structure for society according to principles of mutual advantage
would consent to that system as a way of policing the basic terms of
their agreement.  Such a contractarian approach should make it easier
to meet the burden of proof required to justify punishment in general,
given that it would make punishment voluntarily imposed.  As I will
show, the correct measure of justified punishment is determined by
weighing the benefit a rational agent would receive from such punish-
ment against the harm the agent would suffer were he to be subject to
that punishment.  Applying this test, I then argue that individuals set-
ting up a contractarian system of punishment would not regard the
death penalty as beneficial, on balance, and hence would not select it.
I address objections to this argument in Part IV and then offer some
concluding remarks.
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I
THE ARGUMENT FROM DETERRENCE
A. The Pure Deterrence Theorist
The death penalty proponent’s appeal to deterrence usually goes
something like this:  Suppose each execution deterred eight future
murders.  That is surely sufficient reason to impose the death penalty,
since rejecting the death penalty under such circumstances would
imply that we value a criminal’s life at least eight times more than the
life of each innocent person whose death could be prevented.  As long
as we value innocent life at least as much as guilty life, a demonstrated
deterrent effect is arguably sufficient to justify use of the death
penalty.17
Death penalty proponents do not often make this argument
explicitly, but it is presupposed by much of what they say.  Indeed, it
seems presupposed even by those death penalty opponents who rely
primarily on the ground that studies regarding deterrence have been
inconclusive.  Jeffrey Reiman, for example, opposes the death penalty,
yet allows that if the death penalty were shown to have significant
deterrent effects, he might not be able to stand by his opposition to it:
[W]ere the death penalty clearly proven a better deterrent to the
murder of innocent people than life in prison, we might have to
admit that we had not yet reached a level of civilization at which we
could protect ourselves without imposing this horrible fate on mur-
derers, and thus we might have to grant the necessity of instituting
the death penalty.18
While he couches the point tentatively, Reiman makes clear in the
margins that whether he would be prepared to concede the necessity
of instituting the death penalty depends entirely on the degree to
which it deters.19
The debate with the death penalty proponent thus degenerates
into an argument over which side should bear the burden of proof if
17 See Pojman, supra note 16, at 41 (“Even if we value the utility of an innocent life
only slightly more than that of a murderer, it is still rational to execute convicted mur-
derers.”); Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 14, at 705 (“[O]n certain empirical assump-
tions, capital punishment may be morally required . . . to prevent the taking of innocent
lives.”); Ernest van den Haag, The Death Penalty Once More, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN
AMERICA:  CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 445, 450 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1997) (“I should
favor the death penalty for murderers, if probably deterrent, or even just possibly
deterrent.”).
18 Jeffrey H. Reiman, Justice, Civilization, and the Death Penalty:  Answering van den
Haag, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 115, 142 (1985).
19 Id. at 142 n.33 (“I say ‘might’ here to avoid the sticky question of just how effective a
deterrent the death penalty would have to be to justify overcoming our scruples about
executing.”).
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the death penalty’s deterrent effect is either negligible or inconclu-
sively demonstrable.20  Underlying that dispute is a shared assumption
that significant deterrent effects would be a conclusive consideration
in favor of the death penalty.  Capitalizing on this apparent agree-
ment, the authors of a recent article argue that if the death penalty has
significant deterrent value, governments would be obligated, and not
merely permitted, to impose the death penalty in order to save the
lives of future murder victims.21
Deterrence alone, however, does not provide a moral justification
for the death penalty.  There are at least two reasons for this.  The first
we might call the “problem of torture.”  Suppose it turned out that
torturing a person before executing him had greater deterrent efficacy
than execution alone.  Suppose, for instance, it saved eight additional
lives over and above the eight that would already be saved by the
execution.  Is the death penalty proponent prepared to endorse tor-
ture in this case?  Presumably not.  The deterrence theorist, like eve-
ryone else, will want restrictions on what it is permissible to do to a
person, even if the deterrence rationale alone does not itself imply
those restrictions.  If he accepts such restrictions in the case of torture,
however, he cannot rule out the possibility that these same restrictions
also make the death penalty impermissible.  Later I will suggest that
the relevant restrictions are best understood as having a contractarian
source.  For the moment, it suffices to notice that even the deterrence
theorist will want some such restrictions on the applicability of his pre-
ferred rationale for punishment.22
20 Michael Davis, The Death Penalty, Civilization, and Inhumaneness, 16 SOC. THEORY
& PRAC. 245, 248 (1990) (acknowledging that scholars disagree about who must carry
burden but “not about whether it can be carried”).
21 See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 14, at 705 (“We suggest . . . that on certain
empirical assumptions, capital punishment may be morally required, not for retributive
reasons, but rather to prevent the taking of innocent lives.”).  Indeed, Sunstein and
Vermeule may have been implicitly responding to the 2002 version of the present article
that appeared under a different title on SSRN. See Claire Finkelstein, An A Priori Argu-
ment Against the Death Penalty 15 (Univ. Pa. Law Sch., Research Paper No. 15, 2002),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=347323.  I do not address
Sunstein and Vermeule’s particular argument here, since, if I am correct that the death
penalty is not rendered permissible by the mere fact that it deters, deterrence could not
render it obligatory either.  For a more specific presentation of the philosophical problems
with Sunstein and Vermeule’s argument, see Carol S. Steiker, No, Capital Punishment Is
Not Morally Required:  Deterrence, Deontology, and the Death Penalty, 58 STAN. L. REV.
751 (2005).
22 The death penalty proponent may be prepared to bite the bullet and concede that
torture is permissible under such circumstances.  But he would then have the unenviable
task of explaining why we should be guided by a moral theory that has no apparent trac-
tion with intuitions of near universal appeal. See Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted on Dec. 10, 1984, S.
TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/
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The second reason we might call the “problem of impermissible
tradeoffs.”  Even if the deterrence theorist could distinguish torture
from death, he would face a host of familiar objections to the sugges-
tion that it is permissible to kill a smaller number of people to save a
greater number.  Killing the few to save the many is considered off-
limits, because it is using a person as a means to benefit another,
rather than treating the person as an end in himself.  It is not, for
example, permissible to remove the organs of one healthy person to
save the lives of eight others who need organ transplants.  And if this
is so, we cannot accept executing a criminal for the sake of saving
eight innocent lives.23  Even if one is inclined to reject the Kantian
formulation of the objection, most philosophers endorse the conclu-
sion that it is not ordinarily permissible to kill one to save several or
even eight others.  Since we do not think it permissible to kill one
person to save eight others, we cannot think general deterrence a suf-
ficient moral justification for the death penalty.24
The intuitive resistance to treating rational agents as means
descends from more general moral constraints on the idea of max-
imization.  Such constraints are usually explained by saying that
rational agents have rights.  The existence of rights is supposed to
explain the prohibition on using one person to maximize the welfare
of some larger number of persons.25  The existence of rights also
explains why it is not permissible to violate even one person’s rights to
minimize a larger number of rights violations to other people.  One
might wonder why this is so, since if deontologists care about rights,
then surely they would prefer a state of affairs in which fewer rights
were violated to one in which more were.  But deontologists cannot
pdf/cat.pdf. See also Office of the United Nations High Comm’r for Human Rights, Con-
vention Against Torture, http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/9.htm (last vis-
ited Aug. 13, 2006) (stating that there are 141 parties to Convention as of May 8, 2006).  It
bears noting that we are here discussing the use of torture as a form of punishment. Mat-
ters are arguably different where the use of torture as a pure preventive device is at issue.
23 For a general discussion of utilitarian and deontological theories of punishment, see
TOM SORELL, MORAL THEORY AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 62–77 (1987).
24 There are cases in which the restriction on “using” seems weaker than in the case
above, as, for example, when the person whose death is contemplated is among the eight
who would die if he is not killed.  But many would still see the killing as impermissible in
such cases, since the one is still being used to save the others (and he is not benefiting from
being sacrificed).  As Bernard Williams once famously argued, we would have difficulty
condemning the person who refused to kill under such circumstances, even if we thought it
permissible to kill for the good of others. See Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitari-
anism, in J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM:  FOR AND AGAINST 75,
98–99 (1973).  A person is not obligated to advance the greater good rather than protect his
own moral integrity.
25 See JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS 168 (1990) (arguing that one’s
right not to be killed is “maximally stringent,” even as against claims of significant benefit).
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endorse maximizing anything, even respect for rights, without aban-
doning the restrictions on maximization that are the hallmark of non-
consequentialist views.26  And so once again, if saving a greater
number is insufficient justification for killing one individual, then
deterring future murders cannot justify the penalty of death.
One might, however, reject the above argument as follows:  In
the standard cases in moral philosophy we are considering, it is an
innocent person who is being killed to save the greater number.  In the
case of the death penalty, however, it is a guilty person.  And so, the
argument might run, the appeal to deterrence is not subject to the
complaint about impermissible tradeoffs, because the people being
used to deter others are already deserving of punishment.  Of course,
if the deterrence theorist really thinks deterrent benefits alone carry
enough moral weight to justify the death penalty, this restriction
would be ad hoc.  If executing innocents sometimes deters, the deter-
rence theorist would have no reason to resist it.
Maybe, then, the deterrence theorist does not really mean to say
that deterrence is a sufficient justification for the death penalty.  Per-
haps what he means is that in the case of guilty perpetrators, already
deserving of punishment, deterrence is a sufficient basis for imposing
the death penalty.  If so, the deterrence theorist could agree with the
standard cases in moral theory that purport to show that it is not per-
missible to kill one for the sake of many, while still maintaining that
deterrence justifies the death penalty.  The point is that the person
being used to save innocent lives is guilty of a crime.  It is only in this
context that deterrence has justificatory force, given that it does not
challenge the rights of the innocent.
Restricting the death penalty to the guilty, however, only under-
scores the point that deterrence is not by itself an adequate rationale
for the death penalty.27  On this version of the thesis, the justificatory
26 Sunstein and Vermeule fail to see this point, claiming that “in the abstract, any deon-
tological injunction against the wrongful infliction of death turns out to be indeterminate
on the moral status of capital punishment if the death is necessary to prevent significant
numbers of killings.”  Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 14, at 707.  This reflects a misun-
derstanding of the deontological position on intentional killing.  One cannot conclude from
the fact that deontologists consider intentional killing impermissible that their primary
concern is to minimize intentional killings.  Instead, they regard the injunction not to kill as
an absolute.  They are not, in short, in the business of conducting consequentialist calcula-
tions over injunction-breaking, as that would undermine their rejection of consequen-
tialism altogether.
27 Note further that since any widespread, systemic use of that penalty will probably kill
at least a few innocent people (contrary to my assumption that there are no errors in
applying the death penalty), it is not likely that the death penalty can be restricted only to
the guilty.  In fact, the deterrence theorist does not normally consider the use of the death
penalty invalidated by such mistakes.  Therefore, he does ultimately think it permissible to
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effect is in part secured by a fact—the offender’s guilt—that has
nothing to do with deterrence.  And this implies once again that the
deterrence theorist cannot use deterrence alone as a sufficient ground
for imposing the death penalty.
Of course the deterrence theorist might try to explain the signifi-
cance of guilt in deterrence terms as well.  He might, for instance,
argue that putting innocent people to death would erode the death
penalty’s deterrent efficacy.  If people were executed at random, a
person would have no more reason to fear execution in the wake of
having committed a crime than he would were he innocent.  The
problem with this answer, however, is obvious:  By his own lights, the
deterrence theorist only needs the perception that the death penalty is
being used as punishment for the guilty.  He must therefore be ready
to adopt punishment of the innocent if that would prove the most
expedient deterrent.  It follows that the deterrence theorist must
either abandon the requirement that punishment be used only on the
guilty,28 or admit that deterrence alone is not sufficient justification
for the death penalty and that it must be supplemented with some
further principle in a more complicated mixed theory.  It is to such a
theory that we now turn.
B. Deterrence as a Mixed Theory
The deterrence theorist may not feel threatened by the suggestion
that deterrence can only play its part in a mixed theory of punishment.
He may be happy to concede, for example, that deterrence is a good
reason for imposing the death penalty only when combined with guilt
as a limiting condition.  So let us now consider whether deterrence is a
compelling rationale for the death penalty when used in a mixed
theory of this sort.
I have already suggested that even some death penalty opponents
are willing to accept the death penalty under these circumstances.29
Hugo Bedau, for example, allows that if killing a murderer would
use the death penalty against innocents (although he does not think it permissible for a
death penalty system to set out to do so).  But in this case his argument is subject to the
deontological objection raised above, namely that we do not accept killing one innocent
person for the sake of a larger number of innocents.
28 Some have argued that we cannot punish the innocent, because this would not be
“punishment.”  Punishment, by definition, applies to the guilty.  But it should be clear that
this kind of “definitional stop” does not allow us to avoid important moral questions of this
sort.  For we might as well call the practice of “punishing” the innocent by a different
name, say, “telishment,” and then ask whether that would be justified.  John Rawls
explores an institution of punishing the innocent (i.e., “telishment”) in Two Concepts of
Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 10–13 (1955).
29 See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text.
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bring the victim back to life, the death penalty would be “an instru-
ment of perfect restitution.”30  He writes:
In such a miraculous world, it is hard to see how anyone could
oppose the death penalty, on moral or other grounds.  Why
shouldn’t a murderer die if that will infallibly bring the victim back
to life?  What could possibly be wrong with taking the murderer’s
life under such conditions?  The death penalty would be an instru-
ment of perfect restitution, and it would give a new and better
meaning to lex talionis.  The whole idea is fanciful, of course, but it
shows as nothing else can how opposition to the death penalty
cannot be both moral and wholly unconditional.  If opposition to
the death penalty is to be morally responsible, then it must be con-
ceded that there are conditions (however unlikely) under which that
opposition should cease.31
But I think the abolitionist must not concede that deterrence has even
this kind of moral force, since the concession would give the deter-
rence theorist a fairly direct route, through a series of examples, to
justifying the death penalty under normal circumstances.
To see this, consider “Variation #1.”  Suppose that instead of
bringing his own victim back to life, executing a killer would bring the
victim of a different murderer back to life.  If we accept Bedau’s case,
we must accept this case as well, since the death penalty would still be
“an instrument of perfect restitution,” insofar as executing all mur-
derers would bring all victims back to life.
But now consider “Variation #2.”  Suppose that instead of
bringing a past victim of someone else’s murder back to life, we could
bring a future victim back to life if we executed a killer—someone
else’s future murder victim.  The victim in such a case would die only
temporarily and would magically spring back to life as the effect of the
past execution did its work.  Once again, if we accept Bedau’s case
and Variation #1, it is hard to see why we would reject the death pen-
alty in Variation #2, for in that case we could save every murder victim
by executing all murderers.
From Variation #2, it is but a short step to the deterrence theo-
rist’s conclusion.  In “Variation #3,” suppose that instead of bringing a
future victim back to life, executing a murderer would prevent the
killing of a future victim, but once again the future victim of another
murderer.  What grounds do we have, based on our acceptance of the
prior three cases, for rejecting the use of the death penalty in this
case?  And if we would accept its use, then surely the argument for the
30 HUGO ADAM BEDAU, DEATH IS DIFFERENT:  STUDIES IN THE MORALITY, LAW, AND
POLITICS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 36 (1987).
31 Id.
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death penalty on deterrence grounds is even stronger, given that we
are considering a case in which executing one murderer would deter
not just one but eight future murders.  The deterrence theorist now
seems able to claim that as long as the death penalty is restricted in its
use to guilty perpetrators and actually deters future murders, it is jus-
tified.  Once the death penalty opponent has conceded Bedau’s point,
he will find it hard to disagree with that conclusion.
But is it so clear that we must accept Bedau’s verdict on the initial
example?  Here I think the non-utilitarian has stronger grounds for
objecting than Bedau realizes.  For if it is impermissible to kill one
person to save another, killing the perpetrator in this case should be
impermissible as well.  Indeed, this is what the deontologist presum-
ably must say if he subscribes to the prohibition on using.  But even a
deontologist who rejects the “using” formulation of the Kantian prin-
ciple might see killing the perpetrator as impermissible, since the
deontologist will say more generally that we cannot justify putting a
person to death by pointing to some set of beneficial consequences
from doing so.  Instead, a deontologist will ask whether the perpe-
trator deserved to die.  And with respect to that inquiry, the fact that
the victim would be brought back to life is irrelevant, or at least does
not strengthen the case for execution.  If anything, it will weaken the
case, since the perpetrator will not have killed the victim if the victim
is brought back to life, and thus the perpetrator arguably will not
deserve to die!
The deontologist’s refusal to kill the perpetrator under such cir-
cumstances may seem so much the worse for his theory.  How, after
all, could we possibly refuse to put the perpetrator to death if this
would actually restore the life of the victim?  But the deontologist’s
objection can be made compelling by focusing on a somewhat dif-
ferent but related case.  Imagine that instead of dying immediately
after being attacked, the victim comes very close to death.  As it turns
out, he will die unless he receives a heart transplant.  The perpetrator
of the attack—whom we now have in custody—is the only compatible
donor; without the perpetrator’s heart, the victim will die.  May we
remove the perpetrator’s heart and transplant it into the victim’s
body, thereby killing the perpetrator and saving the victim?  Here, I
admit it is less obviously objectionable than in the previous cases.  Yet
we would have little difficulty understanding someone who thought it
impermissible to use the perpetrator in this way.  Indeed, we might
even understand someone who objected to allowing the fact that the
perpetrator would be a useful organ donor to play any role at sen-
tencing in determining whether he should receive the death penalty.
It is not even entirely clear that we could force organ donation for an
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executed criminal even if the suitability of his organs were not allowed
to count in favor of his execution.  The basis for these rather more
stringent objections would presumably be that a person’s right to
autonomy applies with particular force to his control over the treat-
ment of his own body, even when he is condemned to suffer physically
through incarceration.  It is this same intuition that might lead us to
say that it is not permissible to kill a person guilty of a terrible crime
in order to bring his own victim back to life.
There is, admittedly, something strange going on here.  What
could possibly trouble us about killing the perpetrator to save a victim
if, moments before, the victim would have been entitled to do
whatever was necessary to prevent the perpetrator from killing her?
There is, of course, a difference between the two cases:  In the latter
case we have preventive action—performed before the harm has
occurred—and in the former it is retributive action—performed after
the harm is already complete.  And this is a difference that matters.  It
is permissible, for example, for a victim to use deadly force preven-
tively against a person she suspects is about to rape or even wound
her.  But even the strongest defenders of the death penalty do not
claim that the death penalty should be available as a punishment for
rape or assault.32  It is presumably this difference between prevention
and punishment that prohibits killing the perpetrator to bring the
victim back to life, since doing that arguably falls on the punitive,
rather than the preventive, side of the line.33
The deterrence theorist might respond that the whole point of
deterrence is not to punish or rectify harm to the victim but to prevent
harm.  Executing one perpetrator arguably falls under the preventive
privilege and as such should be easily justified.  Surely, if a woman can
kill an assailant because she reasonably fears he will rape her, it must
be permissible for the state to kill one person to prevent eight
murders.
The opponent of the death penalty might object to this appeal to
prevention on the grounds that there is an imminence problem here:
The deterrent effect of an execution is likely to be diffuse, one that
could take many months or even years to make itself felt.  To elimi-
32 The principle that the death penalty should only be used as punishment for murder
has enjoyed widespread acceptance for many years. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
592 (1976) (holding death penalty for rape of adult woman unconstitutional under Eighth
Amendment). But see State v. Wilson, 685 So.2d 1063, 1070 (La. 1996) (holding death
penalty is not excessive punishment for rape of child under twelve).
33 Admittedly, Bedau’s example is significantly different from the usual case of punitive
action, since normally the victim’s life cannot be restored.  But since, in the ordinary case,
another victim’s life can be saved, we cannot assume this makes all the difference.
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nate the effect of that diffuseness, then, let us imagine that a man is
holding eight innocent people hostage and is threatening to shoot
them all within minutes.  As it happens, he is listening to the radio,
waiting for news of another man’s execution.  If the governor grants
clemency to this other man, the hostage-holder will shoot the eight
people; if the governor denies clemency, the hostage-holder will be
intimidated into releasing the eight.  The governor opposes the death
penalty under all circumstances but knows the hostages will be killed
if he grants clemency.  Does the death penalty opponent still think
that the governor has a moral obligation to grant clemency?  Can he
even argue that it is morally permissible for the governor to grant
clemency in this case?
The problem for the death penalty opponent is that it is hard to
characterize the governor’s choice as purely punitive.  While the deci-
sion to pardon or not to pardon the perpetrator is ex post from one
perspective, it is preventive under another.  Nevertheless, the ex ante
aspect of the governor’s action does not relieve him of the obligation
to stop the execution.34  Refusing to grant clemency would do pre-
cisely what many philosophers claim is impermissible, namely, kill a
few to prevent the deaths of a greater number.  As we have seen, the
fact that more people will be saved than are sacrificed is not by itself
sufficient to justify killing the smaller number; some further principle
is needed to justify that action.  For instance, the situation would be
different if we knew granting clemency to the perpetrator would result
in that same person killing eight people immediately.  In that case, the
imminence of the eight deaths entitles us to kill the criminal, making
the killing an instance of defense of others—clearly permissible as an
extension of the self-defensive rights of each of the eight.  But matters
seem significantly different when the killings to be prevented are to
take place at the hands of a person other than the one being executed.
All this may seem obvious, but it is worth spelling out, because I
think it does finally clinch the case against the deterrence theorist.
His strongest case is when executing one guilty person would prevent
the imminent deaths of many more people, since that brings the situa-
tion closest to defense of others.  But that argument fails when the
person to be executed is not the person who will cause the victims’
deaths.  And this is because, to put the point succinctly, the preventive
34 There is a slight additional difficulty here, which is that the governor might be
thought of as rescuing the criminal from execution if he grants clemency, rather than exe-
cuting him if he fails to do so.  This may be thought to affect our intuitions in this case,
since duties to rescue are typically less stringent than duties to avoid inflicting harm.  But
this is an artificial and somewhat unnecessary feature of our example.  Let us therefore
assume that if the governor does not pardon the criminal, he is in effect executing him.
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privilege does not travel across persons.  Thus, while the deterrence
theorist tries to make all punishment fall under the heading of “pre-
vention,” he is still limited to punishing the individual who will inflict
the harm.  In this respect, the preventive privilege turns out to be
more limited than one might suppose.
To make the point particularly vivid, suppose we have the fol-
lowing modification of our clemency case.  As before, the potential
murderer is listening for news of the death row inmate to decide
whether to kill his eight hostages.  The inmate is strapped to the elec-
tric chair, awaiting the governor’s decision.  It turns out, however, that
one of the hostages can press a button and cause the electric chair to
electrocute its occupant.  If he presses the button, he will cause the
inmate to be executed and, since it will appear that the governor
ordered the execution, the captor will be deterred from killing his hos-
tages.  If he does not press the button, the hostage strongly suspects
the execution will not take place, because he knows the governor
ardently opposes the death penalty.  May the hostage press the button
under these circumstances?
It is very tempting to say that he may, since he has a right to self-
defense.  If he presses the button, he can save his life; if he does not,
he will almost certainly be killed.  How could it be impermissible for
him to press the button?  Nevertheless, I think there is little doubt
that he may not.  It will be helpful at this point to recall our fourth
assumption and its effect on the dynamics of the argument:  Punish-
ment is unjustified unless shown to be justified.  We must, therefore,
assume there is no other argument that could justify the victim’s
pressing the button.  Does the mere fact that the person with his
finger on the button and seven of his friends will die if he does not
press it justify his pressing it?
I believe it does not.  To see this, we need only suppose that the
person sitting in the electric chair is innocent and that he was dragged
in off the street to serve as an example to others.  Clearly, it is not
permissible to kill an innocent person who is not in any way the source
of the threat in order to save one’s own life, since the privilege of self-
defense justifies the use of force against only one’s assailant, not inno-
cent bystanders.  Considered in that light, does it then make any dif-
ference if the person in the chair is a murderer?  Such a fact would
seem irrelevant, since he is no more the source of the threat to the
hostages than if he were innocent.  And, if none of the eight is entitled
to push the button to save his own life, it is certainly not permissible
for the governor to order the execution of that same person in order
to deter the killing of the hostages.  The explanation, once again, is
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that the broad privilege granted to preventive killing does not travel
across persons.
The basic problem with deterrence as a rationale, even when
combined with the requirement of guilt in a mixed theory, can now be
stated:  It is a justification for killing that travels across persons, since
it purports to justify killing one person to deter someone else from
killing in the future.  This amounts to saying that deterrence is
unavoidably utilitarian in that it permits using a person to bring about
a good to someone else.  The most obvious ground for objecting to
this is Kantian, but one need not frame the point in Kantian terms.
We can express the same thought in terms of the basic limits on
responsibility found across a range of ethical theories and in the law.
The doctrine of novus actus interveniens provides a helpful example.
If a person does something that causes another’s death, he is never-
theless not responsible if the causal route by which the death was pro-
duced passes through the voluntary act of another human being.35  We
explain this by saying that a person is not responsible for the free,
voluntary acts of another.  He is responsible for his own acts alone.
I believe that the problem with the argument from deterrence is
connected with this rather deep feature of responsibility.  Killing one
murderer solely to prevent another person from murdering in the
future does not fall under the preventive privilege, since it effectively
holds the first murderer responsible for the murders of another perpe-
trator.  The only preventive justification there could be for executing
the first murderer would be to prevent that murderer from killing
again.  But there is little reason to suppose lifetime incarceration
could not supply specific deterrence of this sort.  Where deterring the
second murderer is concerned, the treatment of the first murderer is
either punitive, in which case the preventive rationale does not hold
and there is no deterrence-based argument for executing the first mur-
derer, or it is preventive, in which case it is invalid because it imper-




A. Proportionate and Moral Equivalence Theories
Retributivism is the theory of punishment according to which
punishment is justified only  insofar as it is deserved by the offender as
35 The exception occurs in cases in which some special doctrine of the criminal law
connects one agent with the free, voluntary acts of another.  Felony murder, vicarious lia-
bility, and accomplice liability are examples.
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a function of the wrongfulness of his act.  Traditionally, the core of the
retributivist’s argument for any specific penalty is the doctrine of lex
talionis, which asserts that a person deserves to experience the suf-
fering he has inflicted on his victim.  Taken literally, lex talionis is an
absurd doctrine:  No one thinks we should rape rapists, assault assail-
ants, or burgle the homes of burglars.  This apparent absurdity has led
some to suggest that retributivism is most compelling without its asso-
ciated theory of the measure of punishment.36  But without some way
to give content to the notion of desert, the retributivist cannot justify
any specific penalty, including the death penalty, and so retributivism
would be vacuous.  It appears, then, that the retributivist defender of
the death penalty must find a better way of matching crimes with
punishments.37
To appreciate the difficulty here, begin by considering just how
approximate such a doctrine must be to work.  It is not just that we
are unwilling to inflict one or two of the more extreme harms, like
rape and torture, as punishment on the criminals who commit them.
The prohibited list also includes more modest harms like forcing a
member of a fraternity to imbibe too much alcohol, or requiring a
rogue cop to remove his clothes and walk half a mile in winter along a
public road—two harms perpetrators have inflicted on their victims.
Indeed, once we consider the wide variety of possible criminal behav-
iors, it is clear that the vast majority of criminal acts could not in any
literal sense be used as punishments.  In fact, there are typically only
three criminal acts we tend to convert into acceptable forms of punish-
ment:  false imprisonment, theft, and (in some states) murder.  The
retributivist who wishes to match crime with punishment must
develop a doctrine that limits penalties to roughly these three forms of
criminal conduct, and so must find a nonliteral way of matching
crimes with punishments.
Two possible “equivalence” strategies for doing this have been
proposed.  The first suggests that we make two lists—one of all the
crimes that are committed and another of all the punishments we
regard as acceptable to inflict—and then match the worst crimes with
the worst penalties, and so on down the line.  In theory, this approach
would match crimes with punishments “proportionately,” i.e., it would
36 See MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME:  A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW 205–06 (1998) (suggesting retributivism is most useful without associated idea of lex
talionis).
37 Although I have never found retributivism compelling as a theory of punishment, I
wish to avoid the wider debate and instead focus on the retributivist’s defense of the death
penalty.  The retributivist has special problems justifying the death penalty, irrespective of
the strength of his argument about the institution of punishment as a whole.
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establish relative levels of desert, without requiring any absolute
metric for matching crimes with punishments.38  Insofar as it does not
tell us which penalties should be available, however, the “propor-
tionate penalty theory” merely helps us assign available punishments,
namely those we are already willing to inflict, to perpetrators
according to the severity of the criminal acts performed.  And this sug-
gests that, whatever its other merits, the proportionate punishment
theory will not help the retributivist justify the death penalty or, for
that matter, any other particular punishment.
The second strategy is to seek to establish a moral equivalence
between crimes and punishments, instead of trying to match them lit-
erally, as lex talionis would do, or to limit retributivism to propor-
tionate relations between crimes and punishments, as the
proportionate penalty theory would do.  The “moral equivalence”
theory maintains that what the perpetrator really deserves to suffer is
a harm that is the moral, rather than the physical, equivalent of the
harm he inflicted on his victim.  In The Philosophy of Law, Kant is
arguably proposing such an approach:
[A] pecuniary penalty on account of a verbal injury, may have no
direct proportion to the injustice of slander; for one who is wealthy
may be able to indulge himself in this offence for his own gratifica-
tion.  Yet the attack committed on the honour of the party
aggrieved may have its equivalent in the pain inflicted upon the
pride of the aggressor, especially if he is condemned by the judg-
ment of the Court, not only to retract and apologize, but to submit
to some meaner ordeal, as kissing the hand of the injured person.39
Kant thinks it possible to treat a perpetrator in a way that is mor-
ally commensurate with the harm he inflicted on the victim without
having to inflict that very same punishment on him.  While Kant does
not articulate the theory in this way, the basic strategy of this view is
to distinguish what a person deserves in some absolute sense from
what it is permissible for society to inflict on him by way of punish-
ment.  The moral equivalence theory thus maintains that while a crim-
inal who locked his victim in the trunk of a car before killing her may
“deserve” to be locked in a trunk himself before being executed, it is
not permissible for us to inflict such a punishment.  Like the propor-
38 See Michael Davis, How to Make the Punishment Fit the Crime, 93 ETHICS 726, 741
(1983) (“The least penalty should, of course, be assigned to the least crime; the greatest
penalty, to the greatest crime.”).
39 IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW:  AN EXPOSITION OF THE FUNDA-
MENTAL PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT 197 (W. Hastie trans.,
Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark 1887) (1796).  For a helpful discussion of this and related
passages, see SORELL, supra note 23, at 149–50 (discussing Kant’s argument that we cannot
always impose punishment that perfectly fits crime).
\\server05\productn\N\NYU\81-4\NYU402.txt unknown Seq: 20 19-SEP-06 16:01
1302 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:1283
tionate version of retributivism, the moral equivalence theory first
eliminates impermissible treatments from the roster of available pun-
ishments.  And like the proportionate punishment theory, it then
matches the offender’s criminal act with a punishment based on a
theory of equivalence.  The only real difference between the two is
that while one uses proportionality as the metric of equivalence, the
other uses the moral quality of the criminal act.
Thus articulated, however, both types of equivalence theory are
woefully incomplete.  Neither provides any test for determining which
penalties are morally permissible—and therefore eligible to be on the
list of available punishments—and which are not.  For example, how
do we know that locking a perpetrator in the trunk of a car and then
killing him is impermissible under the theory but that simply exe-
cuting him is not?  Without already knowing which penalties are per-
missible, we may argue that putting an offender to death is
impermissible but locking him in prison for life is not, or even that
lifetime incarceration is impermissible but a twenty-year sentence is
not.  So both theories end up requiring supplementation by another
moral theory capable of telling us which penalties are available and
which are not.  The theory of permissibility then becomes a side con-
straint on the penalties that are permissible to inflict.  Since the pur-
pose of turning to a retributivist approach to punishment was to
answer the question of which punishments are morally acceptable and
which are not, this is a serious defect.
Suppose, however, that the retributivist supplements his account
with a theory that appropriately distinguishes permissible from imper-
missible penalties.40  As I argue below, it is not clear he can justify the
death penalty even then, since his theory remains seriously flawed in
at least two important respects:  its ordering of punishments by their
relative severity and the lack of congruence between desert and per-
missible punishments.
B. The Severity Objection
The first objection to retributivism is that there are penalties we
think of as morally unacceptable that are also less severe than death.
If we rule out those penalties, we will be compelled to rule out death
as well.  Consider torture.  It is difficult to see torture as off limits on
the ground that it is unacceptably severe, because arguably torture is
less severe than death.  The retributivist’s own method makes clear
why this is so:  If penalties are to be the equivalent of crimes, we
40 I use “retributivism” to refer to both the proportional and the moral equivalence
forms of retributivism and “retributivist” to refer to proponents of either version.
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should rank penalties in the way we rank crimes.  Since we think of
murder as a more heinous crime than any nonlethal assault, torture
should be a less severe penalty than death.  But if torture is an unac-
ceptable penalty, then death is as well, given that death is more severe
than torture.
The retributivist, however, has two potential responses to this
objection.  The first claims that torture actually is more severe than
death.  The second rejects the idea of using severity as a measure of
permissibility.
1. Torture Is More Severe Than Death
The retributivist might suggest that torture is more severe than
death, because it is more uncivilized and more brutal.  That torture is
widely regarded as unacceptable but death is not seems to bear out
this intuition.41  Even if many perpetrators would choose torture
instead of death, the retributivist can reasonably deny that those pref-
erences tell us anything about the relative severity of the two punish-
ments.  It is possible, after all, that a given criminal would prefer to
spend a night in jail than to pay a small fine because he is attached to
money and does not mind confinement.  But this would not show that
a night in jail is less severe than a fine.  Similarly, others might prefer
death to life imprisonment without parole.  Yet surely these prefer-
ences do not imply that life imprisonment is a more severe penalty.
The retributivist is, I believe, right to distinguish between a crim-
inal’s preference for one punishment over another and the relative
severity of those punishments.  We can, that is, think of incarceration
as more severe than a fine because we assess severity in general terms,
not according to any particular set of subjective preferences.  Drawing
the distinction in this way allows the retributivist to avoid apparent
counterexamples to his claim about the relative severity of torture and
death.
The more serious problem, however, is that the retributivist him-
self seems committed to the view that death is more severe than tor-
ture, as is apparent from the way he orders crimes.  A person who kills
another person deserves death; a person who tortures another without
killing him does not deserve death, or so most retributivists believe.  If
41 Michael Davis recently appealed to this intuition in defending his own version of
equivalence theory against an earlier work of mine, claiming that to refute the severity
argument, he need only “provide one plausible example of a jurisdiction in which death
can be justified as a penalty even though torture cannot be.”  Michael Davis, A Sound
Retributive Argument for the Death Penalty, 21 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 22, 23 (2002).  Exam-
ples of such jurisdictions surely abound, but I find it hard to see their relevance to the
normative question of the moral status of torture and the death penalty.
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torture is more severe than death and torture is an unacceptable pen-
alty, the perpetrator who tortures but does not kill his victim would
also deserve death.  Unless, then, the retributivist is prepared to
expand the death penalty’s application dramatically, it seems he
cannot argue that torture is impermissible because it is more severe
than death.
2. Severity Is Not a Good Gauge of Permissibility
A different response to the severity objection is to deny that
severity is the appropriate means of ordering punishments.  There are
many penalties we would readily classify as less severe than death or
even incarceration that we nevertheless think are impermissible to
impose.  The severity objection itself highlights one such punishment,
namely torture.  Other punishments that we often consider impermis-
sible despite being less severe than many permissible penalties are
shame sanctions, such as forcing a convicted sex offender to display a
sign outside of his dwelling revealing his status or forcing a drunk
driver to affix special license plates to his car.42  It is also questionable
whether it is permissible to sterilize repeat sex offenders or to subject
female adolescent offenders to mandatory birth control measures like
Depo-Provera, even though these penalties are less severe than both
torture and death.
Michael Davis, for one, explicitly embraces this argument and
suggests that whether or not a penalty is “humane” is not a function of
its severity.  Instead, he says, “a penalty is inhumane (in a particular
society) if its use shocks all or almost all” members of that society.43
We might thus explain the impermissibility of punishments of lesser
severity by saying they are shocking and the permissibility of punish-
ments of greater severity by saying they are commonly accepted.  If
the abolitionist’s severity argument were correct, however, we could
not differentiate punishments in this way.  Instead, we would have to
take the lowest unacceptable penalty on the list of penalties and say
that any penalty more severe than it would be morally unacceptable.
This strategy would quickly rule out most sentences currently inflicted
for felonies, since many objectionable shame sanctions are less severe
than most terms of imprisonment.
I will allow that the abolitionist is in something of a bind here, for
the death penalty proponent is correct that many lesser penalties are
currently thought inhumane—and ruled out on those grounds—
42 For a discussion of the resurgence of shame sanctions, see Dan M. Kahan, What Do
Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 631–34 (1996).
43 Davis, supra note 41, at 24.
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despite the fact that they are not terribly severe.  And this suggests
that we cannot use severity as a benchmark for permissibility.  Which
penalties are morally permissible and which are not must be a func-
tion of some other moral metric, and until we know what that metric
is, we cannot use the fact that torture is morally impermissible as a
way of arguing against the use of death as a penalty.  How can the
abolitionist answer?
Here I think the abolitionist must be prepared to bite the bullet
and admit that the above argument only shows that we are wrong to
reject shame sanctions and other minor interferences with liberty.
Indeed, we have now observed a compelling reason to allow such pen-
alties, namely that imposing them may enable us to avoid inflicting
more severe penalties that involve a significantly greater loss of lib-
erty.  If, for example, we have the choice between two equally effec-
tive penalties—a shame sanction such as a sign or a license plate, on
the one hand, and a period of incarceration, on the other—we
arguably have an obligation to inflict the less invasive penalty.  On
balance, then, the abolitionist argument I offered above still seems a
good one—that if we reject torture because it is too severe, we should
reject death as a penalty because it is more severe.  But we must admit
that the argument requires us to revise our intuitions about a number
of lesser penalties.
C. Lack of Congruence Between Desert and Permissibility
A second problem with the retributivist’s reliance on either ver-
sion of the equivalence theory is that the argument he makes to
defend the death penalty—namely, that although the offender might
deserve to suffer all sorts of punishment, only certain forms of
deserved punishment are morally permissible—can readily be used by
death penalty opponents.  One of the most common arguments made
against the retributivist death penalty proponent is that there are
moral side constraints on imposing the punishment of death, and that
these operate over and above the constraints imposed by the notion of
desert itself.  Thus, many death penalty opponents are happy to con-
cede that a murderer in some objective sense “deserves” to die but
maintain that death is not a permissible penalty for the state or society
to inflict.44  That is, they offer precisely the same argument that death
44 See STEPHEN NATHANSON, AN EYE FOR AN EYE?:  THE MORALITY OF PUNISHING
BY DEATH 42–43 (1987) (arguing that criminals should not always get punishment they
deserve, “especially . . . when the body that is to give someone his just deserts is the gov-
ernment”).  For a plausible example in which a person deserves an impermissible penalty,
consider a person discovered to be guilty of a crime after having been acquitted of it.  It is,
however, less clear that we can say a person deserves to be tortured while also maintaining
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penalty proponents tend to offer with regard to torture.  Some explain
the position by saying that we compromise our own civility by exe-
cuting even the worst of our fellow human beings.45  Others argue that
the state is usurping God’s role in deciding whether to put people to
death, and that human beings are simply not sufficiently omniscient to
pass life and death judgment on other human beings.46  Still others
argue that there are certain penalties that are inconsistent with the
requirements of human dignity, and that torture and death are among
these.47  Jeffrie Murphy, for example, writes:
Given the exceptional moral gravity of having one’s prospects for a
morally significant and meaningful life interrupted, one might well
want to deny the state any right to do this—i.e., one might adopt a
direct absolute ban on the penalty of death.  For it is by no means
clear that one can show respect for the dignity of a person as a
person if one is willing to interrupt and end his most uniquely
human capacities and projects.  Thus, . . . there is perhaps a case to
be made that the punishment of death is degrading . . . .48
It is important to notice, however, that the arguments presented
here for and against the death penalty have the same structure:  Both
allow that someone who kills another person “deserves” to die, since
offenders must receive the same treatment they inflict on their vic-
tims.  And they both allow that it may be impermissible to inflict cer-
tain penalties that offenders deserve.  They simply disagree about
whether death itself is such a penalty.  Consequently, the debate
between proponent and opponent quickly reduces to the question of
whether we think that death is an excessively harsh penalty.  And that
is not a terribly nuanced ground on which to settle the matter.
The two sides of the debate thus reach different conclusions
based on the same fundamental premises, and there seems to be no
basis for picking one side over the other.  We should not be too hasty,
that torture is not, and never has been, a permissible penalty.  I do not, therefore, find this
argument a compelling justification for the death penalty on retributive grounds.
45 See, e.g., State v. Ross, 646 A.2d 1318, 1395 (Conn. 1994) (Berdon, J., dissenting in
part) (“Not only does the death penalty degrade the individuals who are sentenced to die,
but it also degrades and dehumanizes a society that permits it to be imposed, calling into
question the morality of every one of us.”).
46 Cf. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Capital Punishment, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN
AMERICA 346, 352–53 (Hugo A. Bedau ed., 3d ed. 1982) (“The plain message of capital
punishment, on the other hand, is that life ceases to be sacred whenever someone with the
power to take it away decides that there is a sufficiently compelling pragmatic reason to do
so.”).
47 See, e.g., Jeffrie G. Murphy, Cruel and Unusual Punishments, in RETRIBUTION, JUS-
TICE AND THERAPY:  ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 223, 243 (Wilfred Sellars ed.,
1979) (suggesting ban on death penalty based on respecting human dignity).
48 Id.
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however, to declare the argument a draw.  If the retributivist appears
not to have made his case, that fact alone should be understood as a
benefit to the death penalty opponent.  This follows straightforwardly
from the fourth assumption I articulated in the Introduction, namely,
that punishment is a harm or evil that stands in need of justification.
The result is that the death penalty proponent bears the burden of
proof in this context:  The death penalty cannot legitimately be
imposed unless there is some affirmative argument justifying it, which
is not overcome by arguments against it.  Notice that the retributivist
is particularly affected by this burden of proof claim, for his own
account implies that killing a person is such an evil that the killer
incurs a tremendous moral debt, repayable only with the murderer’s
own life.  It would seem to follow that the executioner, or society
more generally, who takes a person’s life must incur this same moral
debt, unless his act is morally justified.  Without such a justification,
the executioner, and society as his accomplice, is no better than a
murderer.
The argument from torture, then, is problematic for the retribu-
tivist because it shows that it is perfectly possible for the required jus-
tification to be absent where a grievous penalty is concerned.  If the
retributivist thinks torturing a torturer is unjustified, then it is always
possible that killing a murderer is also unjustified.  Without an argu-
ment explaining why death is permissible but torture is not, the
retributivist lacks the justification he needs to win the debate with the
death penalty opponent.  It looks, then, as though the death penalty
proponent has once again failed to meet his justificatory burden.
III
CONSENT AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR PUNISHMENT
A. Some Preliminaries
We have thus far considered the implications of two major
schools of thought about punishment:  deterrence, which is conse-
quentialist, and retributivism, which is deontological.  I have tried to
show that neither can justify the penalty of death.  This may seem to
settle the matter, as almost all traditional writings on punishment can
be grouped under one of these two headings.  In political philosophy,
however, the prevailing tradition since the seventeenth century has
been neither consequentialist nor deontological but contractarian.
Curiously, while the consequentialist and deontological traditions are
well represented in legal theory, the contractarian tradition has not
been.
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Contractarian theories regard the major rules and institutions of
civil society as legitimate insofar as they can be thought of as based on
an agreement among the individuals who must submit to their
authority.  There are two dominant strains in the contractarian tradi-
tion, what we might call “normative contractarianism,” on the one
hand, and “rational choice contractarianism,” on the other.  Although
normative contractarianism descends from Kant, it covers a variety of
views, the most influential of which in recent years has been John
Rawls’s.  According to Rawls, we can best discern intuitions about jus-
tice in a liberal society by asking what principles of justice would be
selected by individuals entering into a political arrangement with one
another, prior to the existence of social institutions of any sort.  Rawls
assumes that in this original position of choice, the contractors are
selecting principles of justice without any knowledge of the particular
circumstances they will inhabit in society or what their personal char-
acteristics will be.49
Rational choice contractarianism, by contrast, descends from
Hobbes.  It asks what form of social organization rational agents
seeking to maximize their own welfare would choose to improve their
positions relative to their presocial baselines.50  To the extent the con-
tractarian tradition has been brought into legal theory, it has almost
entirely been of the normative variety.51  And while one might sup-
pose that the topic of punishment is better suited for contractarian
reflection than other areas, there are only a handful of attempts to
develop a contractarian account of punishment of any sort.52
In this Part, I present a contractarian approach to punishment in
the rational choice tradition and ask whether it provides a more ade-
quate justification for the death penalty than either deterrence or ret-
ribution.53  Arguably, a contractarian approach provides the most
49 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11–22 (1971) (describing original position);
id. at 136–42 (describing veil of ignorance).
50 In its view of human nature, rational choice contractarianism shares the basic
presuppositions of law and economics, i.e., that human beings are rational maximizers
whose preferences obey certain conditions or axioms of rationality.  For a comparison of
legal contractarianism and law and economics, see Claire Finkelstein, Legal Theory and the
Rational Actor, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF RATIONALITY 399, 399–401 (Alfred R.
Mele & Piers Rawling eds., 2004).
51 See generally Symposium, Rawls and the Law, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1381 (2004)
(discussing impact of Rawls’s scholarship on legal world).
52 See generally Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment in Liberal Democracy, 7
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 307 (2004); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, 2 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 217 (1973); C.S. Nino, A Consensual Theory of Punishment, 12 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 289 (1983).
53 By restricting my focus to these three schools of thought about punishment, I do not
mean to suggest that they exhaust the literature on that topic.  Recent writings on punish-
ment, for example, have added new theories to the available roster:  communicative theo-
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promising avenue for justifying the death penalty, given our initial
assumption that any punishment scheme stands in need of justifica-
tion.  This is primarily because unlike the consequentialist or the
deontologist, the contractarian insists that punishment be voluntarily
imposed.  The reason the voluntariness of the punishment enhances
its justifiability should be readily apparent.  Many actions that other-
wise would be morally impermissible become permissible when con-
sented to by the recipient:  Consent turns robbery into gift-giving,
battery into touch football, rape into lovemaking.54  Thus, a punish-
ment that would be impermissible when imposed on the basis of
deterrence or desert may become permissible when its imposition is
consensual.
Moreover, within contractarianism, the rational choice model
appears to make the claim of voluntary agreement easiest to maintain.
Assuming that the death penalty has at least moderately strong deter-
rent efficacy, each rational contractor will regard himself as better off
living in a regime that furnishes such deterrence to serious crimes,
since it increases his security considerably.  Assuming he will not
commit such crimes himself, he stands to benefit from the adoption of
the death penalty and apparently has nothing to lose.  While norma-
tive contractarianism might have deontological commitments that are
inconsistent with the use of the death penalty, rational agents seeking
to maximize personal welfare need not have those same commit-
ments.  At any rate, insofar as normative contractarianism depends
heavily on various deontological suppositions, that approach may col-
ries, see R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY, at xvii (2001)
(justifying punishment because it seeks to “communicate to offenders the censure they
deserve for their crimes”); expressive theories, see Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of
Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 420 (1999) (“The expressive theory of punishment says
we can’t identify criminal wrongdoing and punishment independently of their social mean-
ings.”) (emphasis omitted); as well as virtue theories, see Kyron Huigens, The Dead End of
Deterrence and Beyond, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943, 1033 (2000) (“Aristotle insists on
the rule of law, not of men, on the ground that only governance by reason can be impartial
and even-handed.”).  A complete argument employing the negative strategy I have applied
would ideally consider such alternatives.  Nevertheless, these more recent theories have
frequently been presented as merely explanatory, rather than justificatory, and as such
would not respond to the problem as I have posed it.  To the extent they are presented as
justificatory, they often take the form of mixed theories, in that they are combined with
one of the more classical rationales for punishment. See, e.g., Kahan, supra, at 421 (main-
taining that decisions about whether to punish are “normatively justified to the extent that
we think that the law is accurately apportioning punishment based on the moral truth or
falsity of the valuations that offenders’ emotions express,” and suggesting nonexpressive
metric for evaluating expressive function of punishment).
54 But see generally Leo Katz, Choice, Consent, and Cycling:  The Hidden Limitations of
Consent, 104 MICH. L. REV. 627 (2006) (explaining that there are many overlooked cir-
cumstances in which consent is ineffective at curing wrongs).
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lapse into a deontological account and would no longer be consensual
in nature.
There are, however, two important difficulties the contractarian
justification for punishment must overcome.  The first is the obvious
fact that the offender does not in any literal sense consent to his own
punishment.  Thus, the first task of any contractarian approach is to
explain how it is that criminals can be thought of as consenting to their
own punishment, despite their outward rejection of it.  Many different
accounts of the nature of consent in contractarian theories have been
offered.  In keeping with the prevalence of normative over rational
choice contractarianism, the dominant approach tends to favor hypo-
thetical over actual consent.  In what follows, I argue that a con-
tractarian theory would do better with the notion of constructive
actual consent than with hypothetical consent.
The second difficulty is that even if the criminal can be thought of
as consenting to his own punishment, it is not clear that this consent is
sufficient to justify punishing him.  That a certain treatment of another
human being is consensual does not mean that it is morally permis-
sible.  Some treatments are so extreme that the consent of the recip-
ient cannot dispel the moral doubt that infects them.  In dangerous
games like Russian roulette, for instance, the participants’ consent is
reasonably seen as inadequate to justify the dangers of the game.55
More is needed, therefore, to make the criminal’s consent normatively
salient.  What is important about the consensual justification for pun-
ishment is that it couples consent with personal advantage.  Specifi-
cally, I argue in Parts III.B and III.C that a punishment is justified
only if the criminal has consented to the system of criminal justice that
imposes such punishment because he believes it advantageous to do
so.
Once I have established the basic form of justification for a
system of criminal justice, we will need to ask whether the members of
the society selecting that system would choose to include the penalty
of death.  I argue that they would not.  The final piece of my argument
against the death penalty, accordingly, demonstrates that death is not
a penalty that individuals choosing in accordance with principles of
mutual advantage would select.
55 It is even inadequate to justify each player’s allowing other players to expose them-
selves to a risk of death—so that a player can be convicted of manslaughter or even
murder when another player turns a gun on himself and fatally pulls the trigger. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Malone, 47 A.2d 445, 449 (Pa. 1946) (affirming conviction for second-
degree murder of boy who voluntarily participated in Russian roulette).
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B. The Nature of Consent
Offenders nearly uniformly object to receiving a penalty of any
sort.  It may thus seem absurd to suggest that the criminal consents to
his own punishment.  Nevertheless, there are various ways to construe
the criminal as consenting despite his overt objections.  Perhaps the
most obvious way is to appeal to hypothetical consent and say that the
criminal would have consented to the scheme under which he is pun-
ished if he were choosing a system of punishment in the absence of
any knowledge of his own situation.56  On Rawls’s approach, for
example, the idea of contractarian agreement serves primarily as a
heuristic to determine the conception of justice that best reflects our
considered intuitions of fairness.  Rawls says:  “Our social situation is
just if it is such that by [a] sequence of hypothetical agreements we
would have contracted into the general system of rules which defines
it.”57  He continues:
No society can, of course, be a scheme of cooperation which men
enter voluntarily in a literal sense; each person finds himself placed
at birth in some particular position in some particular society, and
the nature of this position materially affects his life prospects.  Yet a
society satisfying the principles of justice as fairness comes as close
as a society can to being a voluntary scheme, for it meets the princi-
ples which free and equal persons would assent to under circum-
stances that are fair.  In this sense its members are autonomous and
the obligations they recognize self-imposed.58
It should be obvious that the sense in which obligations are “self-
imposed” in Rawls’s scheme is highly attenuated, since the original
position involves neither actual agents nor actual agreement, and so a
fortiori the individuals restrained by a system of justice have not in
any sense agreed to be so restrained.59  The result is that the Rawlsian
notion of consent does little to counteract the presumption against
punishment embodied in our fourth assumption.  Often it is said that
the person who consented is the representative of the person who
must live under the actual laws, and that he is therefore capable of
binding actual persons.  But why should a creature lacking in nearly
all human characteristics count as the representative of flesh and
blood persons?  Rawls might respond that the issue is not about repre-
56 Dolovich, supra note 52, at 315 (“[I]f state power [to punish] is to be legitimate,
agreement as to the terms of its exercise must come from citizens who do not know the first
thing about their own situation and who must therefore accord due consideration to the
perspectives of all members of society.”).
57 RAWLS, supra note 49, at 13.
58 Id. (emphasis added).
59 See Dolovich, supra note 52, at 314–29 (presenting Rawlsian account of punishment
based on hypothetical consent).
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sentation—it is about fairness.  Each actual person should recognize
the rules under which he is punished as legitimate because they corre-
spond to his deepest sense of the fairness of basic institutions, elicited
through the thought experiment of the original position.  But recog-
nizing certain rules as fair does not, by itself, mean a person would
consent to be governed by them.  Fairness might, of course, ultimately
justify imposing those rules on him, regardless of whether he accepts
them.  But that is a different story, and it is not, at any rate, a con-
tractarian story.60
To justify imposing punishment on an offender on the basis of
agreement, we need the consent of that particular agent; the consent
of a relevantly similar person will not do.  One approach that accom-
plishes this is what we might call the “voluntarist” theory of punish-
ment, which asserts that if the criminal is on notice of the punishment,
by committing the crime he consents to the punishment later imposed
on him.  Carlos Nino, for example, argues that assuming certain other
necessary conditions are met (e.g., the punishment is a necessary and
effective means of protecting the community against greater harm),
the criminal’s voluntary act “provides a prima facie moral justification
for exercising the correlative legal power of punishing him.”61
But while the voluntarist approach has the right level of speci-
ficity to justify a particular instance of punishment, the view is prob-
lematic for other reasons.  First, consent to be exposed to a risk does
not entail consent to suffer the injury risked.  That I consent to run a
risk that someone will crash his car into mine on my way to work, for
example, does not entail that I consent to his doing so.62  Thus, from
the fact that a person voluntarily runs the risk of incurring a certain
punishment, we cannot infer that he consents to the punishment itself.
Second, as Larry Alexander has argued, voluntarist arguments
are objectionable because they can easily justify quite excessive pun-
ishments.63  This is because consent lacks a principle of proportion-
ality that would limit the level of punishment that could be imposed
60 These points against the Rawlsian position have all been made before in one form or
another.  But it is helpful to see their effect when they are combined with our fourth
assumption about punishment.
61 Nino, supra note 52, at 299.
62 It is not even entirely clear that a person who agrees to do something she knows with
certainty will have a particular consequence thereby agrees to that consequence.  But this
is a more debatable matter.
63 Larry Alexander, Consent, Punishment, and Proportionality, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
178, 179 (1986) (“The problem is that consent not only substitutes for desert as a justifica-
tion for punishment, but it also overrides desert as a limitation on the severity of punish-
ment.”). But see C.S. Nino, Does Consent Override Proportionality?, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
183, 185 (1986) (arguing that respect for autonomy implies there is no reason for liberal
states to prevent individual from voluntarily causing harm to himself).
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for a given crime.  For example, on this account it would be perfectly
acceptable to assign the death penalty for a minor traffic offense,
Alexander says, as long as the offender was aware of the risk of
receiving that penalty when he broke the law.64  While some might be
prepared to embrace this consequence of a voluntarist account, it
seems a deeply objectionable feature of this theory, since it puts the
voluntarist account out of sync with our prevailing practices of
punishment.
A contractarian account will also diverge from the simple volun-
tarist account with respect to the object of consent.  Instead of
thinking of consent as operating act-by-act and establishing the crim-
inal’s consent to the actual punishment he suffers, we should instead
think of the criminal as consenting to a general institution of punish-
ment, which in turn justifies the particular treatment he receives under
that institution.  The consent, that is, must operate at the level of what
Rawls calls the “basic structure.”65  Thus, a person might better be
said to have consented to his own punishment if he consented to the
institution dispensing that punishment.66  Unlike the normative ver-
sion of this claim, the consent can still be actual, rather than hypothet-
ical.  But what is consented to is not a particular punishment (as it is
on the voluntarist approach), but a punishment scheme in which the
criminal can, on the whole, see himself as advantaged.67  I shall refer
to this view as “rational contractarianism.”
The advantages of rational contractarianism over voluntarism are
clear.  First, the former faces no problem of consent to unintended
consequences, since the voluntary nature of the act is not itself the
source of the consent.  The voluntariness of the criminal’s act serves to
establish responsibility, and the fact that the criminal is responsible for
a prohibited act makes him liable to punishment because he has con-
sented to a scheme that associates punishment with responsibility for
harm-infliction.  Second, rational contractarianism does not face the
64 See Alexander, supra note 63, at 178 (“[O]ne who commits a crime consents to pun-
ishment because he has acted voluntarily with knowledge of his act’s legal consequences,
that is, the punishment prescribed for that act.”).
65 See RAWLS, supra note 49, at 7 (characterizing basic structure as “the way in which
the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the
division of advantages from social cooperation”).
66 See Murphy, supra note 52, at 230 (“I can be said to will my own punishment if, in an
antecedent position of choice, I and my fellows would have chosen institutions of punish-
ment as the most rational means of dealing with those who might break the other generally
beneficial social rules that had been adopted.”).
67 The question of whether consent operates on particular acts or more general rules is
technically independent of the question of whether consent is actual or hypothetical.  But it
is perhaps most natural to think of actual consent as applying to acts and hypothetical
consent as applying to rules or principles.
\\server05\productn\N\NYU\81-4\NYU402.txt unknown Seq: 32 19-SEP-06 16:01
1314 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:1283
proportionality problem the voluntarist account faces.  The justifica-
tion for punishment depends on principles by which individuals have
agreed to be governed.  Those principles will, in turn, limit the types
of punishment to which an individual can be subjected, even when he
is aware he will be subjected to it as a result of his own voluntary act.68
Third, this sort of contractarian account does not justify punishing
criminals on the basis of consent alone, but combines consent with the
notion of benefit.  Specifically, it requires the criminal to believe, in an
ex ante position of choice, that he will benefit from the central fea-
tures of the institution of punishment to which he is consenting.69  As
a consequence, the resulting punishment scheme is better justified
than any system of punishment would be on a voluntarist account.
What we have seen is that if a punishment scheme is to acquire
justificatory advantage by being consensual, the consent must be
actual rather than hypothetical.  But, as Rawls suggests, it is hard to
see how consent can be actual, given that individuals are simply born
into a society and are expected to live by its rules, whatever those
rules happen to be.70  I propose an approach to consent that falls in
between these extremes, applying the specificity of actual consent to a
punishment scheme operating at the level of the basic structure.  That
is, we can insist on actual consent, but regard that consent as construc-
tively given on the basis of tacit manifestations of acceptance of the
rules of a given society.
What, then, should count as a manifestation of actual consent?
On an account that seeks to construct an agent’s consent from actual
behavior, consent must be tacit.  For example, in a society in which
individuals are free to leave but choose to stay, their decision to
remain signifies an acceptance of the rules of that society, and so con-
stitutes a tacit admission that they regard themselves as better off
68 Of course, it is possible that individuals will adopt the following as a principle:
Assign any punishment that serves the state’s general purposes, as long as the punishment
is anticipated as the result of a voluntary act.  That is, it is conceivable that the parties
would incorporate the basic voluntarist principle into their agreement.  But that would be
an unlikely principle for agents contracting for the basic structure of society to adopt, since
such a principle would not appear to be of obvious mutual advantage (and would involve
significant disadvantages given the proportionality problem).  It is far more likely that indi-
viduals agreeing to the terms under which punishment can be legitimately imposed would
tie the justification for punishment to a set of principles that connects the point or purpose
of punishment with the seriousness of the infraction.
69 I shall have more to say about the precise contours of this belief in Part III.C.
70 See RAWLS, supra note 49, at 7 (“[Individuals] born into different positions [in the
basic structure] have different expectations of life determined, in part, by the political
system as well as by economic and social circumstances.”); cf. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM, at xlv (1996) (characterizing basic structure as closed society “we enter only
by birth and exit only by death”).
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under the terms of that society than they would be either in its
absence or under the terms of another available society.  But we may
also wish to require political participation (such as voting) or accept-
ance of some benefit from the state as a sign of consent.  Socrates uses
an argument of this sort in The Crito to defend his decision to remain
in prison and allow the state to carry out its sentence.  In the following
passage, Socrates imagines what “the Laws” would say if confronted
with the question of whether it is legitimate for Socrates to flee his
sentence:
We gave you birth.  We nurtured you.  We educated you.  We gave
to you and to every other citizen a share of every good thing we
could.  Nonetheless, we continue to proclaim, by giving leave to any
Athenian who wishes, that when he had been admitted to the rights
of manhood and sees things in the City and its Laws which do not
please him, he may take what is his and go either to one of our
colonies or a foreign land.  No law among us stands in the way or
forbids it.  You may take what is yours and go where you like, if we
and the City do not please you.  But whoever among you stays, rec-
ognizing the way we render judgment and govern the other affairs
of the City, to him at that point we say that by his action he has
entered agreement with us to do as we bid.71
Socrates imagines the “implied contract” to be one reached
between the Laws and the citizen, rather than among citizens, as
would a modern contractarian.  Partly for this reason, Socrates fails to
consider what the terms of the contract might be, and so also fails to
ask whether citizens would place limits on the kinds of laws they
would agree to obey.  Nevertheless, the nature of the implied consent
Socrates imagines is quite similar to that which I have suggested,
namely that actual consent can be constructed and inferred from a
combination of the individual’s political participation and the social
benefits he receives.
There is, however, a difficulty with treating consent in this
instance as actual, since the willingness of a person to abide by the
rules of a given criminal justice system may or may not match his
rational, reflective views.  We are interested only in what each actual
person thinks insofar as he is rational.  The question is how each
rational agent would regard the balance of benefits and burdens of the
rule governing punishment when he reasons correctly and is fully
informed.  Constructive actual consent is established by considering
the preferences of an actual person, purified of confounding irratio-
71 1 PLATO, The Crito, in THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 105, 126 (R.E. Allen trans., Yale
Univ. Press 1984).
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nalities.  It allows us to retain the idea that it is actual agents binding
themselves, rather than individuals being bound by representatives.
As with individuals deliberating behind the veil of ignorance,
actual contracting agents have limited information about themselves.
These limits, however, are due simply to the ordinary doubt about
one’s future with which we all must live.  I cannot know whether I will
end up committing a crime—not because I am uncertain about my
own characteristics or those of the world in which I live, but because I
am unsure what life will bring and so am unsure what my proclivities
and preferences will lead me to do.  Notice that the degree to which a
rational contractor would regard a certain penalty scheme as benefi-
cial may depend on when in his life he assesses the benefits from that
scheme.  For example, a person assessing the merits of the death pen-
alty would consider it differently depending on whether he were to
imagine himself subject to the penalty at the age of twenty or the age
of eighty.  In the latter case, there would be significantly fewer years
of life foregone, and thus a rational agent might regard the deterrent
benefits as greater relative to the losses he would suffer by being sub-
ject to the penalty at that late point in life.72
But recall that we are considering a form of actual, rather than
hypothetical, consent, and this will help us to select the correct
moment at which consent should be specified.  The agent’s consent to
a scheme of punishment should be thought of as given at the first
available moment at which he is old enough to be capable of making
the choice to accept a particular political system.73  What is important
on this account, however, is that individuals are committing their own
future selves, making it more justifiable to regard their consent as
binding than it is under hypothetical consent, where actual persons are
committed by a set of hypothetical representatives instead.
Let us now consider the nature of the required benefit in a
rational contractarian account.
C. The Benefit Requirement
As I have argued, the consent of the offender is necessary but not
sufficient to justify inflicting punishment on him.  There is a second
72 Of course, the marginal benefit of increased bodily security is also lower for a person
at the end of life compared with someone closer to the beginning.  The point remains that
the value of the death penalty under this test may differ depending on the point in life at
which one applies the test.
73 We could treat this as the moment at which he is first entitled to cast a ballot for an
elected representative, but there might be other, better markers of political maturity.  At
any rate, we will consider the age of consent as roughly coinciding with the beginning of
young adulthood.
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condition that must be combined with consent:  The agent must con-
sent on the basis of a belief that his welfare will be improved by the
scheme to which he is consenting.  The improvement need not actually
materialize for this “benefit requirement” to be met.  An agent’s con-
sent is still adequately validated if he sincerely believes he will benefit
under the rule, even if he turns out to be mistaken or the benefit fails
to materialize.74  What is essential is that the agent see himself as
faring better under the terms of the rule than he would fare in its
absence.
How does a rational agent determine whether he will fare better
under a given rule?  The standard answer is that he asks whether his
expected utility is higher living with the relevant rule than living
without it.  On this view, if his expected utility under the rule is posi-
tive, he will consent to it, even if he is aware that he might end up
worse off under the rule than he would be in its absence.  The ques-
tion is whether, under conditions of uncertainty about the effects of
future rules or institutions, the benefit requirement is compatible with
this kind of gambling.  I suggest that, on the contrary, the benefit
requirement screens out gambles; the requirement is not satisfied if
the agent cannot see himself as assuredly better off under the relevant
rule than he would be in its absence.
This may seem unacceptably strong.  Why would it not be
rational for a person to gamble with respect to his future welfare
under extremely favorable odds?  The answer is that while the benefit
principle is stringent, it applies only to rules or institutions that are
part of society’s basic structure.  While gambling may be rational for
individual decisionmaking as applied to particular choices made
within that structure, decisions that establish the structure itself are
unlikely to be attractive if they risk leaving the agent worse off than
he would have been in their absence.  Thus, a rational agent contem-
plating a structural rule or institution must believe that he will fare
better than he would without that rule or institution, whatever life
should happen to bring.  Rational contractors might be happy to risk
elements of their current welfare for a chance at much greater welfare
in the future, but they will not be willing to take that same risk when
they stand to lose their most fundamental political and economic
protections.
The no-gambling supposition for rational agency may seem
extreme, but some version of this condition appears to be part of
74 There are, of course, conditions under which the agent’s consent is vitiated by a false
promise of benefit.  But in such cases the consent is invalid because of normative condi-
tions rendering the consent illegitimate, not because the requirement of benefit is not
satisfied.
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nearly every contractarian proposal in both the normative and the
rational contractarian traditions.  John Locke, for example, expresses
what appears to be a no-gambling condition with the so-called
“Lockean proviso,” which requires that agents who remove resources
from the commons leave “enough and as good” for others.75  Such a
condition would make no sense from a contractarian perspective
unless individuals in a state of nature were unwilling to gamble with
basic welfare, since each might otherwise wish to gamble that he
would benefit more from having no limits on what he takes from the
commons than he would lose by others doing the same.
A no-gambling condition also seems to be the driving force
behind the “maximin” principle for choice under uncertainty, to which
Rawls, as well as several of his predecessors, subscribe.76  According
to maximin, we should adopt “the alternative the worst outcome of
which is superior to the worst outcomes of the others.”77  In other
words, we should choose the option that has the best worst-case sce-
nario.  Rawls explains this by saying that it would be rational to
choose the principles of justice that a person would select for a society
in which “his enemy is to assign him his place.”78  It is this no-gam-
bling decision rule, Rawls thinks, that rational deliberators in the orig-
inal position would adopt for establishing the basic structure of their
society.  Rawls also appears to insist on a no-gambling condition in
several other places in his account.  He says, for example, that deliber-
ators will require that the first principle of justice take “lexical pri-
ority” over the second principle, meaning that individuals would not
be willing to trade basic liberties against any increase in social or eco-
nomic benefit.79  He also suggests that contractors will adopt the “dif-
ference principle,” which allows economic inequalities only insofar as
75 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 19 (C.B. Macpherson ed.,
Hackett Publ’g Co. 1980) (1690) (“[F]or this labour being the unquestionable property of
the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where
there is enough, and as good, left in common for others.”).  For an examination of some of
the difficulties with Locke’s theory of tacit consent, see John G. Bennett, A Note on
Locke’s Theory of Tacit Consent, 88 PHIL. REV. 224 (1979).  Bennett writes:  “The theory
of tacit consent which Locke puts forward in his Second Treatise is interesting because it
shows the lengths to which Locke was driven in order to maintain that government power
and authority must be based on consent.” Id. at 224.
76 See RAWLS, supra note 49, at 154–55 (explaining when maximin is reasonable); R.
DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS:  INTRODUCTION AND CRIT-
ICAL SURVEY 279 (1957) (“[Maximin] has the merit that it is extremely conservative in a
context where conservatism might make good sense.”).
77 Rawls, supra note 49, at 153.
78 Id. at 152.
79 Id. at 61 (“[Such] ordering means that a departure from the institutions of equal
liberty required by the first principle cannot be justified by, or compensated for, by greater
social and economic advantages.”).
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they are to the benefit of the least advantaged members of society.80
The difference principle only makes sense because deliberators will
not wish to gamble that they will be Bill Gates, or even that they will
be among the relatively privileged.  Accordingly, they will be sure to
provide well for those less advantaged.81
A similar sort of reasoning appears in defense of what public
policy analysts and economists call the “Precautionary Principle”—
the idea that in the face of substantial uncertainty about the likelihood
of certain events occurring, the rational strategy is to privilege the
avoidance of catastrophes.  Once again, this constitutes a rejection of
the idea that it is rational to gamble that one will reap significant ben-
efits from a risky arrangement.82
D. Applying the Benefit Requirement to Punishment
Let us now consider what the benefit requirement would imply
for a system of punishment, and let us start with an example.  Con-
sider a group of contractors trying to decide how much and what kind
of protection they should institute for private property.  They have
already selected a series of rules establishing a system of ownership,
and they now seek a means of enforcement.  They must weigh the
following considerations.  On the one hand, they would like the max-
imum deterrence feasible for violations of ownership rights.  On the
other hand, they also want to protect their own personal freedom and
would like to maximize independence of choice without interference
from others.  Maximizing independence of choice would leave no pro-
tection for ownership, while maximizing protection for private prop-
erty would sharply curtail personal liberty.
In balancing security and liberty, each person asks himself:
Would I be better off under the terms of a contract that established
penalties for theft and other violations of property norms, assuming
that I myself might end up subject to those penalties, than I would be
if there were no private ownership at all?  If the penalties for theft are
too low, the deterrent effect will be insignificant and private property
80 Id. at 78 (“[Such inequality] is justifiable only if the difference in expectation is to the
advantage of the representative man who is worse off, in this case the representative
unskilled worker.”).
81 Note, however, that the difference principle is not an all-purpose no-gambling condi-
tion, as it does not address the welfare of all those who are less well off than Gates, but
only the very least advantaged, or the worst-off members of society. Id. at 81–83 (high-
lighting difference principle’s exclusive focus on least advantaged).
82 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR:  BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
109–17 (2005) (critically assessing both maximin and Precautionary Principle); Stephen M.
Gardiner, A Core Precautionary Principle, 14 J. POL. PHIL. 33, 45–49 (2006) (discussing
relationship between maximin and Precautionary Principle).
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will not be protected.  If the penalties are too high, agents receiving
the penalty would be worse off than they would have been in the
absence of private property and the benefit requirement would not be
satisfied.  Because we require that the institution of punishment be
justifiable with respect to each and every person who is subject to its
authority, the benefit requirement, coupled with consent, must be sat-
isfied with respect to each individual contracting agent.  Thus consent
must be unanimous.  The benefit requirement, in combination with
the requirement of unanimous consent, then, makes it possible for the
social goal of deterrence to dictate specific parameters for the punish-
ment of each separate crime.
Notice the advantages of rational contractarianism as compared
with the two leading approaches to punishment.  On the one hand,
rational contractarianism solves the two central problems associated
with pure deterrence theories—the problem of torture and the
problem of impermissible tradeoffs.  With regard to the former,
rational contractarianism rejects extreme penalties, since these would
normally fail the benefit test.  With regard to the latter, contractari-
anism rejects the involuntary sacrifice of a smaller number of persons
for the sake of a greater number, since no institution that treats one
person solely as an instrument for enhancing the welfare of others
would pass the benefit test.  It is easy to see that contractarianism
would accordingly rule out punishment of the innocent along with
other impermissible tradeoffs.  For a society that left individuals sub-
ject to punishment at random would be worse than complete chaos,
since in the former, persons must protect themselves not just against
lone individuals but against a state that possesses a monopoly on
power.  If the institution of punishment is to leave members of society
better off than they would be in its absence, it must allocate sanctions
predictably, fairly, and according to principles of control and indi-
vidual responsibility.
Notice also that on the contractarian approach I propose, there is
no worry about punishment traveling across persons as it does in the
mixed deterrence account.  It is true that, according to rational con-
tractarianism, deterrence is the basic aim of the punishment agree-
ment, and deterrence schemes usually involve traveling across
persons.  But in fact the problem does not arise on this contractarian
view.  For although the institution of punishment thus agreed to would
be deterrence-based, and hence would hold one person responsible
for the acts of another, each individual punished would have agreed to
be so held.  There can be no objection to deterrence on these grounds
if each agent has agreed to be held responsible for the acts of others in
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this way.  Each contractor is like a person who has agreed to stand as
a guarantor for another’s debts.
On the other hand, contractarian theory captures the greatest
strength of the retributive principle, by establishing a kind of moral
equivalence between crime and punishment.  The benefit requirement
demands that each contractor consider both what he gains from pro-
tecting the interest in question and what he would suffer if punished.
Since the importance of the underlying institution establishes the
gravity of the violation for which we punish the offender, the benefit
requirement creates a metric for matching offenses with penalties.
Moreover, it does so without making the retributive theory’s mistake
of rejecting deterrence as a legitimate aim of punishment.  It is this
feature of retributive theories that presumably dooms them to gener-
ality, since the notion of desert substituted in its place is unavoidably
nonspecific.83
The question we must now ask is whether rational individuals
would choose to implement the death penalty, given the conditions I
have articulated.  In our framework, the answer will depend in part on
how great the benefits are from that punishment.  Each person enters
into society because he fears for his bodily security.  The security and
life expectancy of each person are increased if those who violate
society’s primary norms are punished, for this will deter other poten-
tial criminals from violating those norms as well.  Let us call the
effects on the bodily security and chances for longevity each person
expects from a legal rule his “anticipated security.”  By including the
death penalty in the schedule of available penalties for the worst
crimes, each individual will increase his anticipated security, and so it
may seem rational to select it.
Each individual, however, must also assess possible punishment
from the standpoint of a person subject to that penalty.  Thus, each
contractor must place himself in the position of a person sentenced to
death.  Now, if a person thinks it likely that he will receive the death
penalty, he will probably not see himself as advantaged by the rule
that authorizes its use.  It is of course possible that a person subject to
the death penalty would have been murdered long before his execu-
tion if not for the death penalty’s deterrent effect.  A rational agent
must allow for this possibility.  But since, under the benefit principle, a
rational contractor will not choose to gamble with rules of the basic
structure, he will not base his decision on this contingency.  Instead,
83 I also develop this approach to punishment in Claire Finkelstein, A Contractarian
Approach to Punishment, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND
LEGAL THEORY 207, 214–18 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005).
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he will choose to guard against the possibility that he will be executed
without adequate compensation in deterrent efficacy.  For in such a
situation, his anticipated security will not be positive.  A rational con-
tractor would therefore choose to reject the death penalty.  The fol-
lowing analogy may help make this persuasive.
Suppose a number of people are concerned about the possibility
of suffering dual kidney failure and having no access to public organ
banks or dialysis machines.  To protect against this risk, they contem-
plate entering into a “Kidney Society,” specifying that if any member
of the group finds himself needing a kidney to survive, the group
would hold a lottery to determine who would supply that individual
with the needed kidney.  Once chosen, the donor would have no
choice but to yield, and a kidney could be removed, by force if need
be.  Would it be rational for individuals to enter into such an agree-
ment in order to enhance their “expected kidney security?”  Ex ante,
there is a benefit to a rational agent in entering into such an agree-
ment.  If the danger of dual kidney failure is sufficiently great, and the
loss to an individual of being the one chosen by lot to donate a kidney
is either sufficiently remote or sufficiently bearable, the Kidney
Society’s agreement confers a net expected benefit.  Since the usual
way of thinking about benefit is in terms of expected utility, it would
be rational for each contractor to enter the society.
But I have been arguing that an ex ante perception of benefit is
not sufficient to justify the agreement as one of mutual advantage.  I
claim that expected benefit calculations are not the most rational way
of thinking about rules that pertain to the basic elements of a person’s
welfare, when those elements will be governed by foundational social
rules.  Instead, the agreement must be reasonably certain to increase
advantage to each person under every situation he envisions once the
agreement is in place.  So if the Kidney Society is part of the basic
structure, each agent must still regard himself as benefited in the case
in which he is selected at random to provide the needed kidney.  Now
imagine someone who has his kidney removed after drawing the short
straw in the lottery, but who lives the rest of his life without needing
anyone else’s kidney.  Such a person is clearly better off with two kid-
neys than with one and the benefit that induced him to enter the
Kidney Society is one that never accrued.  Given the way things
worked out, entering the Kidney Society will have turned out to be a
bad choice from his perspective.84  My suggestion, then, is that envi-
84 One might object that this analysis overlooks the benefit that insurance against dual
kidney failure provides, both ex ante and ex post.  Even if a person receives no actual
benefit from a gamble, he may regard the ex ante chance of benefit as in itself a benefit.  I
have argued elsewhere for such a claim, and, conversely, that an ex ante chance of harm is
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sioning this possibility in advance, a rational agent would not enter the
Kidney Society, at least under the conditions just described.85
In the case of the death penalty, the contractor’s reasoning might
go like this.  The death penalty provides enhanced deterrence for the
very worst crimes, and thus presumably it will be restricted to murder.
Each contractor then asks himself whether he would regard the deter-
rent benefit he had received from living in a society with the threat of
the death penalty for murders as increasing his net anticipated
security if he were actually subject to that penalty himself.  In this
case, the protection advantage each agent receives from the death
penalty is itself what is removed by the penalty, unlike in the theft
example, where these two values are different.  The question is there-
fore quite straightforward:  Would each contractor regard himself as
experiencing a net increase in anticipated personal security from the
death penalty over the course of his lifetime in the case in which he
ends up subject to it?
In a world in which no other penalties were available, the death
penalty might be selected by the contractors in an initial position of
choice.  In that case, the alternative to having any punishment would
be the state of nature, one that, if Hobbes is to be believed, would be
so brutal and insecure that no one could expect to live into old age.
Every moment, as Hobbes describes it, would be spent in “continual
fear and danger of violent death,” and “the life of man solitary, poor,
nasty, brutish and short.”86  Relative to the state of nature, even the
person condemned to die would regard himself as benefited, given the
horror of his life in the absence of such penalties.
Our contractors, however, do not face so stark a choice.  Instead,
they can compare systems of punishment with the death penalty to
those with a range of serious but nonlethal punishments.  Since the
death penalty is only one in a range of possible punishments, including
incarceration and fines, the question the contractors face is:  Does the
marginal increase in personal security due to the death penalty, when
compared with other possible punishments, deter murder so much
that it outweighs the marginal loss of personal security a person sub-
ject to that penalty would suffer?  Here we can see that even in the
itself a harm.  This ex ante benefit will balance the cost of losing the gamble, however, only
if the actual loss is fairly small and the expected value of the gamble quite significant. See
Claire Finkelstein, Is Risk a Harm?, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 963, 967–74 (2003).
85 A different kind of kidney lottery might be more appealing.  If, for example, the
kidney donor were to receive financial compensation for donating a kidney, and if that
compensation were sufficient to make the resulting state of affairs on balance beneficial,
then signing up for the kidney lottery would not violate the benefit principle.
86 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. XIII, para. 9, at 76 (Edwin Curley ed., Hackett
Publ’g 1994) (1668).
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unlikely event that each application of the death penalty deterred
eight additional murders, the marginal value of that added deterrence
would likely be outweighed by the marginal cost of the death penalty.
The contractors therefore would reject it.
The possibility that, under unforeseeable circumstances, one
could be subject to the death penalty makes adopting it more gener-
ally irrational, since the penalty violates the benefit requirement.  A
contractor would regard himself as worse off for allowing that punish-
ment than if it had never been adopted in the first place.  The person
subject to the death penalty, like the person who sacrifices a kidney
without ever needing another’s, has received benefits that will turn
out not to have been worth the costs.87  Thus, since each rational con-
tractor must imagine himself in the position of the losing party in such




The most significant objection to my argument thus far is that,
unlike the case of kidney failure, a person has a choice over whether
to commit a crime.  If this is true, then whether he risks suffering the
death penalty is under his control in a way that suffering kidney
failure is not.  A rational agent, it seems, would opt for the most strin-
gent penalties for all sorts of crimes, never intending to commit one
himself.  In that way he would maximize his net anticipated security,
since he would benefit from the deterrent effects of the harsh penal-
ties but could be sure that he would never end up subject to them.
Indeed, it seems that the higher the penalties, the greater the deter-
rent benefits and thus the more the agent would benefit.  Further-
more, the agent might actually be pleased with the deterrent effect on
himself, since the higher the penalties for crime, the less likely he
would be to commit a crime.88  Presumably he has a current prefer-
ence that he not commit crimes in the future.  If, by contrast, the pen-
alties for a given crime are too low, he loses both the deterrent benefit
with regard to others and increases the likelihood that he himself will
commit a crime that will make him subject to the penalty.  Does there
87 The two situations are admittedly different, in that the death penalty does confer
deterrent advantages on the individual contractor, whereas the member of the Kidney
Society who does not have kidney failure gets no actual benefit other than insurance or the
“chance benefit” I discussed earlier in note 84.  But in both cases, arguably, the benefit
does not compensate for the burden, and thus a rational contractor perceiving this ex ante
would not choose either arrangement.
88 I am indebted to Dan Markel for this point.
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not then seem to be ample reason for the contractors to adopt the
death penalty?
Rational contractors, however, may still want to guard against
excessive penalties in case they are not deterred.89  Rational individ-
uals are likely to allow for the possibility that they may feel the need
to commit a crime in the future, and so they may choose to limit the
severity of responses to it.  We only need imagine that it might be to
an agent’s benefit to commit a crime, despite the fact that the agent
also views it as beneficial ex ante to make that act a crime.  If so, the
rational agent might wish to preserve his ability to commit that crime
and so would not agree to a penalty as harsh as the death penalty in
deciding ex ante how much punishment it deserves.  And he might
wish to preserve this option, even though he is aware that preserving
the option for himself would preserve that same option for everyone
else.
This argument may seem perverse, for I am suggesting that
rational agents would reject the death penalty because they would
want to leave open the possibility that they might someday need to
commit a crime for which the death penalty would otherwise be
authorized.  But I think the point can be made plausible in the fol-
lowing way.  Rational agents would eschew social rules that severely
restrict or limit their freedom of choice to the extent it is feasible for
them to do so.  That is, their desire to deter crime must always be
balanced against a countervailing desire to protect the range of
choices available to them.  If the death penalty purchases only a mar-
ginal increase in deterrence at the cost of a substantial increase in the
coercive powers of the state, it would be rational to reject it.  Because
the particular identity of the crimes to which the death penalty would
be applied remains subject to change, individuals cannot ensure that
they are able to protect their freedom where they would most wish for
it.  Limiting the severity of the punishments that can be inflicted for
the most severe crimes is thus a way to blunt the force of undesirable
liberty restrictions.
But why draw the line between life in prison and death?  What is
so special about death?  The answer to this question, of course, has to
do with what is so special about life, namely that it is the necessary
condition for all other benefits an agent might receive.  Loss of life is
thus normally impossible to offset with other benefits.  The most
89 It is of course possible that a person could be subject to the death penalty without
having committed a crime at all.  I have assumed throughout that the death penalty could
be administered flawlessly.  Relax that assumption by allowing even a small chance of
error and contractors applying the benefit requirement will have an obvious reason to
reject the penalty of death.
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obvious way in which this is so is that the person killed cannot have
future projects, plans, or pleasures, and thus all considerations of
future welfare must come to an end.  It is true, of course, that future
benefits are not the only kind of benefit that could justify a particular
punishment to a rational agent.  Past benefits might also provide a
justification under the benefit principle.  But the only past benefits
there could be that would compensate a person for a premature death
is the deterrence of what would otherwise be an even more premature
death.90
Here is a final way to put the point:  On a contractarian theory, it
is rational to establish a strong system of rights to bodily integrity,
rights that cannot be derogated from in specific cases for the sake of
short term gains.  While future members of society might regard them-
selves as benefiting from a contract in which others agree to subject
themselves to the death penalty on the condition that every other
member of society is willing to do the same, such an agreement would
conflict with the broader principles of protection for bodily integrity
and enforcement of defensive rights that rational members of society
would also be concerned to establish.  The same, by contrast, need not
be said of agreements to be subject to deprivations of liberty.  Incar-
ceration leaves the body intact and one’s natural life extended.  It
allows for the continuation of plans and projects of at least a rudimen-
tary sort and does not foreclose challenging one’s conviction and per-
haps regaining one’s liberty.  It also allows for the possibility of
compensation with future benefits, whether through advancement of
personal projects or the bestowing of various pleasures.
A related objection to rational contractarianism, as I have pro-
posed it, has to do with the scope of the individuals that should be
included in the initial agreement.  On traditional contractarian
approaches, those who violate the terms of the contract are thereafter
totally excluded from it.91  On such a view, the contract itself imposes
no limitations on what is acceptable to do to violators.  Locke, for
example, says that those who violate the terms of the contract are like
wild beasts; they can be hunted down and killed indiscriminately.92
And Rousseau says that “every evildoer who attacks social rights
90 I am assuming, as contractarians typically do, that the rational agents whose consent
to social arrangements is sought have “non-tuistic” preferences, meaning that their prefer-
ences do not generally take into account the preferences or well-being of other agents.
91 For a discussion of the contractarian approach to violators’ loss of contractual rights,
see Christopher W. Morris, Punishment and Loss of Moral Standing, 21 CANADIAN J.
PHIL. 53, 62–65 (1991).
92 See LOCKE, supra note 75, at 14 (“[O]ne may destroy a man who makes war upon
him, or has discovered an enmity to his being, for the same reason that he may kill a wolf
or a lion.”).
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becomes by his crimes a rebel and a traitor to his country; by violating
its laws he ceases to be a member of it . . . .”93  The present objection
is just a version of that idea, namely that the contract ought not to
include those who are violators or free riders, and so we are entitled
to treat such individuals in any way we see fit.
From a certain perspective, the point is quite defensible.  If
society is a “cooperative venture for mutual advantage,”94 it makes
sense to think of criminals as outside the scope of all voluntary
arrangements, since cooperating with them would not be to the advan-
tage of those who remain faithful to the terms of those agreements.
Moreover, it arguably makes no sense to include the treatment of con-
tract violators within the terms of the contract itself, since that seems
to suppose that we are taking into account the perspective of those
who intend not to abide by the terms of our initial contract regarding
the basic structure.
But despite these merits, I think the traditional approach to con-
tract violators should be rejected.  For while it is true that the initial
contract is made only among those who accept the conditions of coop-
eration, cooperators can become defectors at any point after all have
agreed to the contract’s terms.  It is therefore incorrect to equate
defection with noncooperation at the outset.95  Several additional con-
siderations support this approach.  First, defections can be large or
small, and it may be that it is still advantageous to cooperate with
those who defect, as long as their defections are sufficiently minor.
Second, it is not possible to address the problem of noncooperation at
the outset in any way other than by refusing to contract.  But defec-
tors are themselves subject to the terms of an antecedent agreement
and can therefore be dealt with contractually.
A final argument against the traditional approach to violators is
that it simply seems wrong to think of a defector as beyond the
bounds of all social interaction, someone who deserves none of the
protections or entitlements that those who enter into rational relations
with others receive.  We do not normally think of even the most hei-
nous violations as depriving their perpetrators of basic dignitary
rights, such as the right to be free from torture, the right to speak in
one’s own defense, and the right to appropriate levels of bodily dig-
nity and comfort.  It is true that nonrational creatures are often
93 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND THE FIRST AND SECOND
DISCOURSES 177 (Susan Dunn ed., Yale Univ. Press 2002) (1762).
94 RAWLS, supra note 49, at 4.
95 See Claire Finkelstein, Hobbes and the Internal Point of View, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
__ (forthcoming 2006, manuscript on file with author) (arguing for rationality of adhering
to social contract based on common knowledge of rationality).
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thought of as possessing a subset of these same rights, and we cannot
think of them as parties to a social contract.  This suggests a basis for
assigning rights to biological agents outside the contractual context.
But the protections afforded such creatures are thought to be signifi-
cantly weaker than those extended to even the worst criminals.  For
these and other reasons, the conditions under which human beings
may permissibly inflict sanctions for noncooperation on members of
their own kind should be thought of as governed by an antecedent
agreement they make to enforce the terms of cooperative interaction.
Only by including potential violators in the social contract can the
contractarian model provide any practical guidance to a theory of
punishment.  This allows us to capture within a contractarian frame-
work the basic deontological intuitions that made retributivism seem
initially attractive.  As we have seen, these deontological intuitions are
insufficient in and of themselves to produce a theory of punishment
directly.  It is only when combined with the aim of deterrence that
they find their proper place.  Normally, the aim of deterrence and
intuitions concerning desert cannot coexist in a theory of punishment.
In the contractarian approach I have proposed, however, these ele-
ments complement each other without contradiction.
CONCLUSION
I have argued that the contractarian account of punishment is
best situated to meet the most fundamental requirement of a theory of
punishment:  the need for a sufficiently robust justification for punish-
ment that will overcome an initial presumption against it.  A rational-
choice contractarian account can meet this justificatory hurdle better
than the two traditional accounts of punishment, as it restricts legiti-
mate punishment to voluntarily imposed treatment.  Such a require-
ment does not imply that any treatment to which the recipient
consents is justified.  Rather, as I have argued, it asserts that a treat-
ment to which the recipient consents is permissible if it is also to the
agent’s benefit.
The reason that contractarian agents agree to live in the shadow
of any particular form of punishment is that they anticipate that signif-
icant benefits will flow to them from the deterrent effects it brings.
Their willingness to subject themselves to the risk of this harsh treat-
ment comes from their belief that they receive greater security from
the threat of punishment than they would lose, even if they are subject
to the penalty whose threat they desire as a means of deterring others.
But it is just as mistaken to think that this benefit could by itself justify
a scheme of punishment as it is to suppose that consent alone could do
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so.  Neither consent nor benefit standing alone has sufficient norma-
tive salience to overcome the initial presumption against punishment
with which we began.  What we have seen instead is that the consent
of the agents who must live under a system of punishment confers
legitimacy on that punishment only if their consent is based on a per-
ception that they will be better off under such a system than they
would be in its absence.
Although contractarian arguments should naturally fare better
than deterrence and retributive theories of punishment, we have also
seen that the prevailing contractarian accounts are flawed.  Volunta-
rist accounts, on which mere consent is thought sufficient to justify
punishment, make the mistake of thinking that consent alone can
confer adequate legitimacy on a system of punishment.  At the other
extreme, normative contractarianism suggests that our considered
intuitions about fairness, when suitably elicited through a stylized
original position, should provide adequate justification for a system of
punishment.  But this account fares little better than its normative
counterpart in the retributivist tradition, because it provides no basis
for thinking of such a system as consensual and therefore no basis for
thinking of the resulting institution as benefiting from the lower
hurdle of justification that consensual systems can claim.
Unlike deterrence and retribution, the contractarian enterprise
makes each person the guarantor for every other person’s conformity
to law.  A person who violates rules of conduct agrees to suffer pun-
ishment to ensure that others do not thereby think themselves free to
do as he did.  Their willingness to abide by the rules of the institution
from which they benefit is itself instrumentally motivated:  Each agent
agrees to hold himself accountable in a certain way in order that
others will hold themselves accountable in that same way.  It is this
core idea, as I understand it, that makes contractarianism both attrac-
tive and normatively powerful.
As we have seen, a natural thought to have about the death pen-
alty against the background of such a theory is that it is easy to justify:
The more deterrence the better, since the more each agent can
enhance his anticipated security through the availability of a given
penalty, the more inclined each would be to live under its shadow
himself.  Rational contractarianism thus offers the most promising
avenue for justifying the death penalty, at least as compared with the
deterrent and retributivist alternatives we considered.  But I have
tried to show that even this argument in favor of the death penalty is
problematic, since each agent must imaginatively project himself into
a world in which he himself is subject to the death penalty, and must
still regard the death penalty as a benefit under such conditions.  Put
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otherwise, the contractarian argument in favor of the death penalty
requires us to eliminate potential criminals from the scope of the
social contract, and I have offered reasons to think we ought not pro-
ceed in this way.
The thought here does not seem too very distant from Hobbes’s
observation that no man can be understood as having transferred
away his right to self-defense, “because he cannot be understood to
aim thereby at any good to himself.”96  Of course, Hobbes’s claim
seems implausible on its face, since we can imagine various scenarios
in which an agent comes to see himself as benefiting from giving up
self-defensive rights.  Yet Hobbes may have had a less literal under-
standing of the right to self-defense in mind, one that recognized that
no man can rationally and voluntarily abandon that right, given that
defending his life is the point and purpose of all that he does.97  The
basic thought I have tried to develop is Hobbesian in this sense:  Since
the purpose of punishment is the enhancement of one’s bodily and
material security, there is an internal limitation to the amount and
severity of punishment rational agents would choose to include in the
basic structure of society.  This does not mean that the death penalty
would be rejected under any conceivable empirical circumstances.
But it does suggest that rational agents would reject the death pen-
alty’s inclusion in contemporary criminal justice systems, and they
would continue to reject it under any circumstances we can currently
and reasonably imagine.
96 HOBBES, supra note 86, ch. XIV, para. 8, at 82.
97 For a more complete discussion of Hobbes’s point, see Claire Finkelstein, A Puzzle
About Hobbes on Self-Defense, 82 PAC. PHIL. Q. 332 (2001).
